Richard Dawkins Falls into the Partition Fallacy

Of all the so-called "New Atheists" the one I have the most respect for is Richard Dawkins. Harris and Hitchens have their moments as well, but Dawkins is brilliant in his field of study, like him or not it's only fair to admit that. Which made me all the more surprised when I heard an answer he gave to a challenge from a caller on a call-in radio show. The question was concerning ethics and his answer was well within the framework of sociobiological behavior. This was not surprising given his expertise. However, when defending Atheism one needs to know how to supply a good philosophical answer to philosophical questions. That's not to say that he could never use his own views to defend his position but one should never present a rebutting defeater before an undercutting defeater (a defeater is what it sounds like: a sufficient response to give good cause to reject an argument or position. Undercutting defeaters attack the presupposition upon which the argument rests and rebutting defeaters deal with the superstructure). Despite how brilliant he is, he leaves much lacking in this area.

Like most atheistic scientists of our age he simply does not have the goods to defend Atheism philosophically, nor does he demonstrate that he thinks that he needs to. Of the "New Atheists" Hitchens (some may say Dennet) probably does this the best despite how rhetorically laden his arguments are. You will find none of these "New Atheists" positing the Law of Identity as the axiomatic principle of the universe (Rand). No "New Atheist" will present a posteriori inductive logic to suggest a vicious infinite regress applied to theistic causality (Russell). These Atheists were the big guns and they were philosophers. Their arguments were so well thought out you have to describe them with vocabulary packed with meaning to even come close to summarizing what they actually meant, otherwise your stuck with inaccurate, moronic versions of their arguments like "who created God?" (truncated version of Russell who's real version can give nightmares) or "Everybody's selfish and that's where your god came from: yourself" (troglodytic hunch back version of Rand who's real version is brilliant). You would have considered it your lucky day to catch them in the philosophical error Dawkins made. It was like he just had a biologically based argument and ran through a proverbial wall leaving a Dawkins shaped hole behind him. And yet, the caller nor the host could challenge him, they just bought his assumptions and ran with them. There is a reason why the Rands, Russells, and Nietzsches labored over their arguments: the subject requires it. And yet, the most popular Atheists are the ones that can package their arguments in a nifty sound bite to feed to the masses to throw in the face of Christians who, sadly, don't know what to do with it. The Atheist can pat themselves on the back as being smarter and go on his or her way wondering why the Christian doesn't change their mind when they can't answer the tough question of who created God. Perhaps the Christian doesn't change their mind because the fallacy of the assumptions bleed through implicitly like a picture game where there are two pictures and one has slight differences for the observer to point out: a quick glance won't make the difference clear but the errors are there one just needs to take the time to find them.

Okay, I'm done teasing you, now to Dawkin's error. To understand the problem with what he said you must first know some things about ethics. What is the goal of ethics? When we talk about ethics are we trying to find the best ways to catalog activity that falls under the branch of ethics philosophically or is there more going on? What one hopes to accomplish with ethics is not just lists of behavior but also one hopes to learn a proper way to behave. There is no partition between behavior, knowledge and authority to have a viable ethical system, anything short of this is to be in error. The goal of ethics is to describe as well as prescribe behavior, and in order for there to be prescription there must be authority. If there is no force to ethics then how one ought to act is irrelevant if there is no authority then there is no enforcement of the "ought." And if ethics cannot tell one how to behave then I ask why we engage in the study of ethics at all. Let me give an example, the argument for emotive ethics is that our feelings tell us what is bad, but we OUGHT to follow those feelings. The utilitarian version of ethics will describe the best outcome for any number of reasons (the most popular being for the most people, think Spock "The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few"), but it will also point out that we ought to behave a certain way to achieve that result. Pragmatic ethics will tell us what works is what is ethical, but it will say that we need to do what works in order to actually be moral. What is the force behind these oughts? Some say a good functioning society while others would say personal pleasure, etc. We could systematically defuse any of these systems but that would be chasing too long of a rabbit hole (but it is tempting). For the purposes of this post I am simply establishing that ethics requires a telos or an outcome, a behavior, a prescription. If you went to the doctor and he said that you had a fatal illness, but offered no solution, just a diagnosis, you would not think him to be much of a doctor. To go a step further, if he described the treatment needed but could not apply it you still would not think of him to be much of a doctor. The same is true of all ethical systems they are nothing if they only describe they must prescribe or they are not ethics, they would only be facts.

So, Dawkins is taking phone calls and someone brings up a point now made popular by the movie Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed. The long and short of the argument is that if man is an evolved being he is no more or less animalistic than what is observed in nature. Atheism must then support, or at the very least, allow, some form of racism; for nature benefits those who want to survive. If there is a weaker species then one should be racist. Being against racism is arbitrary in a system where behavior is informed by natural selection. But perhaps its more than merely arbitrary, perhaps if one does not act out in suppressing the weaker then the weaker cries "racism" to overcome the stronger. If the stronger bend the weaker have now become the stronger, the king of the jungle does not fight back and allows rats to overcome his prowess as the lion. The error comes in Dawkin's response where he says that all humans come from a common ancestry therefor we OUGHT to not be racist. Did you catch that? Let me ask you a question, why OUGHT we not be racist given Dawkin's DESCRIPTION of a monolithic genealogy? Because he says so? Because that's really cool? Where is the force that's going to prescribe that I not be a racist? When did we find out that racism was wrong, after the Human Genome Project? Are we going to have a special force that fights hate crimes with a double helix for their symbol? Let us pretend that I was a committed Nietzschean Atheist. It would entail that I believe that racism is a guiding principle for making the world a better place. Along comes Richard Dawkins who says that I come from the same ancestry as my enemy whom I believe to be inferior. Let us go further and say I believe Dawkins, but I start thinking teleologically (outcome and purpose) and I say that we may come from common ancestry but we are not going toward common conclusions and along the path of history some of us have gotten weaker therefore they should be illuminated for the sake of better conclusions. What will Dawkins do? Continue to PRESCRIBE common ancestry? Common ancestry is a description and nothing more. In an Atheistic system nature is our example for ethics and all the illusions of progress won't change that. There can be no prescriptions with force in any Atheistic ethical system. All the ethical descriptions in the world doesn't amount to one prescription and all the descriptions that Atheism has conjured cannot satisfy the prescriptions that the study of ethics logically demands. This is what I have named The Partition Fallacy and it is replete throughout atheistic writings on ethics (including the Utilitarian, Pragmatic, Subjective, Emotive and the Neo-Categorical Imperative). Dawkins is not alone.

Dawkins is the most accomplished and most brilliant of the "New Atheists" but the area he needs to be the strongest in is the area he lacks the most. In this regard he is way behind the discarded atheists of the past. Perhaps it does not matter because they also never overcame the Partition Fallacy.

House on Faith

I was recently watching an episode of House entitled House Versus God. It was about a faith healer that seemed to have extraordinary abilities. He seemed to know people's problems through revelation not observation, he seemed to actually heal others. House would not be deterred. "There is always an answer," he proclaimed. What he really meant was: There is always a naturalistic answer.

I have no desire to defend faith healers. I would want to defend them as much as any other thief or con. What interested me was something I have seen a lot of in my many years of watching television, and that is television's defense of faith.

I have noticed that it is usually presented in a roughly similar dichotomy. There is one who is bent on science and one who is unmovable in their faith. If you don't believe me, see my earlier post on Friends where Ross is defeated by Phoebe by presenting plausible doubt (although I really don't think she actually establishes that, but that's already been covered).

At the end of the day, I think that television is actually attacking faith. They present faith more as a virtue than anything worthy of our intellectual attention. What is that virtue? I think it is bravery coupled with ignorance. So where is the attack? Is not bravery a good thing? Sure it is, but in this case one has to be ignorant in order to be brave. It really is a subtle attack. They make the person of faith seem virtuous but utterly wrong. The one of science is the one who is usually the strongest and the more intelligent. The one of faith really only has one argument which is the fallacy of stacking the deck. No matter what one would try they could never prove the person of faith wrong because they have made ignorance a necessity for having their position. This is usually indicated by statements such as the sin of "challenging faith." The more ignorant one is the more faith they have and therefore even more virtuous.

The good news for the person of faith is that this is a straw man argument. Faith does not have to be opposed to science. It has to be opposed to Verificationism, which is what is really being promoted on the science side of the argument. What is being said is that faith is of no value for knowing the way the world is, only science can do that. Verificationism is the belief that only what one can verify with one's senses is meaningful or of value. If you ask Richard Dawkins how the world is he will tell you "we are working on it." No Verificationist can tell you how the world really is or why there is something rather than nothing. They can only say we are working on it. Verificationism has a fundamental contradiction at its core (among many other problems) which caused philosophers to reject it a long time ago (verificationism cannot verify itself). Nominalistic assumptions of Verificationism are also a problem, but that will be covered in my conclusion to Christianity and Ontology.

One may say that Theism cannot tell us the way the world is. I would argue that Theism offers a negative corollary to the assumptions that underpin Verificationism-as-science and therefore is internally more consistent and therefore offers a more plausible explanation (much to the chagrin of the faith healers). The only defense of the Neoverificationists is the rejection of logic and not very safe footing. In fact, I would even say that would be a brave position to have.

Science is not a problem for a person of faith. Philosophy, however, is offering hurtles that I believe the Neoverificationists cannot logically withstand.

Faith Class: Romans

We will be covering a lot of material, however, there is much that never makes it to the classroom. I will try to keep this blog posted as frequently as I can.

I am not done with Ontology and God, Time, and Eternity and hope that it will not be too long before I get back to those issues. I will probably revisit those topics in a more brief format (which I am finding is the normal structure for most blogs).

Two issues from last week that were not covered:

1)The New Perspective:
Moo has a brief discussion concerning this in the EBS text. It questions the assumption that the Jews of Paul's day really thought that they were justified by works. Rather, they were a people saved by a covenant with God. So what about Paul's stress on the law? They were being saved by the covenant and it was conditioned on their obedience to the law. Their efforts were to maintain their covenantal status. Where did this leave Gentiles? This is the hypothetical resolution to Paul's motives for stressing that one is not saved by works. At the time of the publication of Moo's work this view had gained favor with scholars; There have been challenges to this view since, in fact, I have met someone doing a dissertation on just this subject and he believes that the New Perspective is in a grave situation in regard to its sustenance as a viable approach to studying Romans as well as history.

2) Why did Paul want to bring the gospel to Rome if there was already a predominantly Gentile church already in place?
Some have speculated that Paul did not see it as a true church because it was not founded by an apostle. I think we are all in trouble if this were the case! Fortunately, Paul used the term "ecclesia" which means "church" so I think we are safe. So what did Paul mean? He said he feared building on another's foundation, so why did he want to bring them the gospel? As it turns out, he could have been talking about the gentiles at large (in Rome) since most Jews had been kicked out of Rome by AD 49. That seems to be the simplest conclusion and I favor it unless there are good reasons to doubt it, I am aware of none but I could be wrong. Another possibility is that Paul makes it clear in a large portion of his writings that those who persevere until the end will be saved, he could be bring them the gospel to produce faithfulness and encourage them, which is what he says he wishes to do at the beginning of Romans. What ever the case I do not believe Paul contradicted himself and this can be well established within the text.

Christianity and the Study of Ontolotgy

What is Ontology and why should it concern Christians?
As many of you know my area of study is geared mainly towards philosophy in so much as it concerns Atheism. However, I have discovered that this endeavor requires a great deal of proficiency in general philosophy and all of its constituent branches. The branch I find myself focusing on the most is epistemology and I have enjoyed this focus with little regrets. It has even helped me to understand core doctrines and theology. I have come to enjoy the question "How can I know that there is a God?" Always a fascinating conversation even if my argument is not accepted. In the midst of all of these tedious issues is another branch of philosophy that is replete with assumptions and cavalier attitudes. In many ways it is foundational and there is high stakes for the Christian here. In fact, if more people would study ontology we could communicate matters of faith with a lot less baggage. I can assure you of this, the more one studies ontology, christian or otherwise, the quicker you can get to very important questions and answers.
...and ontology is?
the effort to explain the nature of existence and to describe features that are true of all entities. I should be able to clear these questions up in one post. Okay, maybe not. I think we can at least see why this is a worthy area of study for Christians; but truthfully if everyone studied it we wouldn't have the politicians in office we have now because they would have to be a lot more honest. I believe this study would help anyone. One thing is for sure: the person who studies ontology does not come out the other side the same. It will change your entire thought process. You will not be impressed easily by so called "academics" or "scholars". Why? Because, sadly, many of them have never studied ontology either. These are the same people who believe philosophy to be a synonym for "opinion", that is incorrect. Ask this same person what an opinion is and they will try to give you a philosophically objective answer. These are the type of self defeating thinkers we breed in the academic world. C.S. Lewis in his book "A Pilgrims Regress" speaks of a horse called "Reason" that picked him up and he rode it away from the lies, let us join him.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE?
Have you ever thought about dieing? I am going to assume that it is safe to think you have. What is the scariest element of death? I think it is the idea of nonexistence. I almost do not even care about how I die or whether it will be painful, although these are worthy concerns. Until I became a Christian this idea haunted me. The funny thing is is that I can't even conceive nonexistence. Maybe my fear was really the unknown. What is it for something to exist? Let us do a thought experiment. Imagine something real, say, a bike. Now, let us imagine something not real like a leprechaun. What may be most important to realize, in the study of ontology, is that the bike is real. That is one characteristic the bike has. So the most important difference between the bike and the leprechaun is that the bike exists. Is not this difference as real as any other difference in the world? For example, a red crayon and a blue crayon. David Hume wrote that all things imagined are made up of things that actually do exist. Yet, we still recognize that there are things that are made up and do not exist. The Theist should begin to recognize the importance of this question already. Ask a committed Atheist why he or she does not embrace Agnosticism and you may hear this limerick, "I do not have to know everything about the universe to know there is no Easter Bunny that exists so why do I have to know everything about the universe to know there is no God that exists?" (the answer has to do with necessity and contingency but no room on this post to digress) This is being postulated as warrant for the knowledge that the status of God is that he is made up and does not exist as opposed to other things the Atheist will say does exist(notice how epistemology and ontology are closely related here). Existence is important and brash answers won't due for tough questions. Let us ask deeper questions about the nature of existence.
WHAT IS GENUS?
Similar to the biological use; logic is a branch of philosophy and we find its meaning for our purposes here. A class of individuals or a subgroup having similar attributes. An example may be a group of particulars with univocal essential properties. If you do not study philosophy that may have made no sense so let us say "tables" could be a genus. Everything that is not a table would not share its genus. Is existence a genus all to its self? Do all things exist in the same sense? The answers to these questions are very important. Would you say that a table has a different form of existence to a chair? If simply existence is a genus than it appears not. What about a table compared to the number 6? Is the existence of these two things the same? I am inclined to say no. One exists in a completely different relationship to the other and in a completely different way. Not all are inclined to agree that simple existence is a genus. For example, that table has a multitude of parts. We will use an Aristotelian dichotomy to understand this; these multiple parts should be called "accidental properties". So does the table exist or does the sum of all its parts exist and the table only has the appearance of existence? The accidental properties are there and together they make up what we CALL a table. So the table has existence as long as it has its parts, but once the parts are removed the table ceases to exist and yet the parts continue to have existence. Perhaps there are two different types of existence, or maybe there are different kinds of things that have existence. Is it possible that the two things share in one type of existence and that there is only one type of existence in which all things share? Or are there other options? We will come back to this later.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ONTOLOGICALLY EXISTENTIAL POSTULATES
Many dismiss ancient thinkers because it is assumed that scientific progress will answer all our questions. I have read, with great amusement, Carl Sagan who is very impressed with science and scientists. If I were a Buddhist I would probably be tempted to believe that Richard Dawkins is Sagan reincarnated. However the assumptions that go on unquestioned never cease to amaze me. Gary Gutting, professor at Notre Dame and an expert in philosophy of science, religion and European philosophy states, "Since the ancient Greeks, people reflecting on science have been strongly attracted to the idea that there is a single comprehensive method employed in any genuinely scientific work. We will begin with this idealizing assumption, although we will later encounter ways in which it might be doubted." (pg 423, Blackwell, A Companion to the Philosophy of Science) There is now a gap between the philosopher and the scientist. It has not always been this way, but today it is the state in which we find science. Gutting also points out that the a priori sociological assumptions of scientific inquiry are almost always reflective in the result, making true objectivity questionable. Earlier thinkers were better at investigating scientific methodology because they were also philosophers. My main point is that to dismiss ancient thinkers due to how long ago they were positing their claims amounts to ad hominem (Aaron Sorkin, producer of the West Wing, would do well to take note since this comprised a great portion of his argumentation).
...and what about the history of ontological inquiry?
1)Monism
Parmenides argued for the oneness of all reality. The syllogism for his argument can be summed up:
-Reality can be either one or many.
-If reality is many, then many things must differ from each other.
-However, there are only two ways in which things may differ: by being (something) or non-being (nothing).
-How can something differ by nothing? Either something is something or nothing is nothing, but something cannot be nothing and nothing cannot be something.
-Can something differ by something or being? Being seems to be the only thing that all things have in common, things cannot differ in the very same thing they have in common.
-Things cannot differ at all; everything is one.

Ontological Pluralists do have objections and those will be investigated, but lets continue with our chronological survey. The most famous disciple of Parmenides is Zeno (of Zeno's Paradox). He had further proofs to support Monism.
-If reality is many, then absurdities and impossibilities will follow.
-An example of Zeno's meaning is found in his famous arguments. The most famous is "The Achilles and the Tortoise": The Achilles and the Tortoise are having a race and the Achilles gives the tortoise a head start. After the Tortoise is given a bit of time the Achilles starts and one would expect him to pass the Tortoise and win easily (not so in Zeno land). The Achilles must first pass the half way point in order to pass the Tortoise. Then the Achilles must go to the next half way point, then the next, and the next and so on ad infinitum. The Achilles would never catch the Tortoise because there would always be a mid point to traverse and if reality was many there could never be a singular midway point, but this is an absurdity.
-Given Zeno's proof that there is no such thing as an actual infinite mid point then one can safely conclude that the postulate that "reality is many" is a contradiction and should be considered false.
-Reality must be one.

Is all reality mathematically divisible (further on we will explore the notion of the difference between the "world" and the "universe" so if you have questions after this you may find answers there)? Perhaps some things that one would, and could sustain logically, consider "real" can not be divided at all, say propositions; Can I divide a sphere from a ball? If I divide a body of a human have I also divided the person (again, we will look at in more depth later)? Perhaps there is a point in which things may no longer be split or division reaches its finitude (in math it could not, but that would be a POTENTIAL infinite, we are talking about an ACTUAL infinite)?
In response to Parmenides, some have insisted that non-being is a real difference to being and that Parmenides's point needs further substantiation. Some also think that things can differ in being as well. Both entities can be said to posses being while have a different type of being (hold your questions these objections may become more clear later). The most condemning argument against Parmenides is a logical fallacy in his 5th premise; "things cannot differ in the very same thing they have in common" assumes that all things are the same and begs the question. He may as well said "All things are the same because they are the same and that is what they have in common and therefore cannot differ." This is Circular Reasoning.

The next view is Pluralism or "reality is many". The atomists and the Platonists accepted this position.
Atomists felt that things differed by absolute non-being. Their argument was that reality is made up of innumerable and indivisible atoms which fill the void of space. The atoms differed in size, shape, and space. Each atom ontologically possessed its own position in space and the emptiness or non-being around each atom defined the atom by this non-being. The absolute nothingness around each atom defined each atoms difference by absolute non-being. Being could be recognized by non-being. How could nothing cause differentiation? When was the last time nothing caused anything. If my kid is quiet for too long and I ask what she is doing and she says nothing, I know something is going on. Nothing does not cause something and so differing by nothing is akin to not differing at all. We would be doing our selves a disservice not to recognize that indeed atoms have been split. We should also mention super string theory at this point as well.

God, Time, and Eternity X, Part 3

As God takes action outside of time and corresponding action happens in time, how should we understand the many reactions that are performed in a monolithic, atemporal reality (if reaction is a theologically correct term in this case)? In other words, how could God act once to the many actions that an individual makes? After all, there is no time to make actions so there must be one singular deed, not multiple sequential actions. Feinberg admits that this is no problem for the advocates of Middle Knowledge by its self. However, could one hold to Atemporality and Middle Knowledge without problems?
Atemporality holds that God does all actions timelessly and plans all actions to occur at the time of his choosing. keep in mind that the Atemporalist is not saying that these "reactions" happen simply before the given event, time has no meaning here, there is a timeless "reaction" or simple action outside of time. God must do many things in response to every possible action that is going to take place (I fear that Feinberg is assuming that these "reactions" are taking place before a person's choices which is incorrect, but take this critique with a grain of salt). The first point Feinberg makes concerning this problem is that God would be left with a great many unused actions. I have to say that I am puzzled over Feinberg's criticism. I am on the fence as far as middle knowledge is concerned, but this seems like it misunderstands Middle Knowledge. The point isn't that God knows AND does all possible outcomes, it is that he KNOWS all possible outcomes and what would happen otherwise. But, to react to what does not happen is not omniscience, that would be divine speculation (some call Middle Knowledge "Divine Speculation", but I believe this leads to a false understanding of omniscience, the backer of Middle Knowledge is not in danger of the heresy of Open Theism) and that is not the postulate of Middle Knowledge. God knows whether a person would act favorably or unfavorably, say to the gospel, in every possible scenario. If the person would ultimately reject the gospel then God is in keeping with his own character to place this person in a position that seems far removed from the possibility of salvation. God did not DO every possible thing before this person was placed in a remote region outside of earshot of the gospel. God only did in "response" to what he KNEW the person would do. I believe, therefor, that the advocate of Middle Knowledge is in no danger logically to hold to atemporality and Middle Knowledge, Feinberg's critique finds no purchase here. It does not compromise Middle Knowledge, atemporality or a synthesis there of. Feinberg also notes that this problem's propensity increases when libertarian free will is introduced, but again, I believe that he has couched an incorrect definition of Middle Knowledge at the apex of his argument.
Feinberg moves on to the issue of personhood. The first thing he states is that the atemporalist may respond that the notion of personhood is not easily defined. A point well taken in my opinion. Then Feinberg refers to a theologian named William Mann who further appeals to Danial Dennet, yes the Atheist not the fire juggler, whom gives 6 criterion for personhood.
1) A is rational
2) A is a being which states of consciousness can be attributed
3) Others regard or can regard A as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed
4) A is capable as regarding others as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed
5) A is capable of verbal communication
6) A is self-conscience; i.e., A is capable or regarding him/her/its self as subject to states of consciousness
This is a list that Peter Singer and other abortion/euthanasia advocates would love to champion as the quintessential definition of personhood. This definition would serve any eugenics program well. I, however, have a much more liberal interpretation of personhood which includes bearing the image of God. But wait! Don't you have to assume the bible to be true in order to maintain this position? I never said I would use it as an isolated apologetic, but among Christian theists, I see no problem. Does one need to meet this criteria to achieve personhood? Not in my opinion. Does God need to meet this criteria to be a person. I think he does meet it, however I'm not sure that he needs to. Which brings me back to the point that Feinberg dismisses, are we ready to give rigid terms and conditions to personhood? In many cases I think not. But, I also have to admit that Feinberg's argument may still stand in light of the fact that certainly God meets these criteria even if the unborn does not. So I will grant him the argument to continue.
Feinberg is one of the most responsible scholars I have ever read, in fact he has inspired me to do likewise. He doesn't let me down here either, as he urges caution with this definition of personhood. However, God does meet this definition and except for provision 1 and 5 Feinberg sees no hope for the atemporalist to survive the critique of person in regard to numbers 2,3,4, and 6. An atemporal person should be able to do these things. The list Feinberg gives is as follows: intending, purposing, remembering, forgetting, responding to prayer, becoming angry, rejoicing, and being effected by actions of others. I am once again puzzled. Why does God have to do these things the same way man does? In fact, some of these things are simply anthropomorphisms despite Feinberg's attempts to say otherwise. Cannot God respond to prayer in perfection, rather than in reaction? I can't recall a time in scripture when remembering or forgetting, in reference to God, meant anything less than perfect forgetfulness. What does that mean? That God no longer counts sin against us AS IF he had forgotten something. What happens when someone forgets a date? They don't go on it. What happens when God forgets sin? He does not punish , as if it had never happened or as if there was a sin to remember in the first place. AND YET, God does indeed remember otherwise he would have no need for his covenants. We count on him remembering even when he so called "forgets" because we rely on his justice. I see no reason to give up the traditional understanding of God's relationship to time as atemporal because of what is clearly meant to be understood as analogies for the human cerebral palate. Additionally, it seems that Feinberg simply assumes that because there are things that require action in time for humans that this carries over for God because it is difficult to understand otherwise. Why should this bother us; we can not understand God exhaustively and there has been no readily ascertainable contradictions that are worthy of note.

God, Time, and Eternity X, Part 2

How are we to understand God's ability to react to events in time or does God react? What do we make of God's person hood as we try to answer this question?

Can an atemporal being know what time it is in a time laden world? Feinberg seems to think that any answer that maintains atemporality will be dubious. Atmeporalists maintain that this question is not relevant because God's activities are timeless and then has the effects of his activity occur within time and with perfect precision. Feinberg insists that this answer makes no sense. I have to say that I think that this hardly constitutes throwing out the Atemporal position. There are many matters in Theism that I can not exhaustively understand, but I do not discount them. If Feinberg was sighting a contradiction then I would be more inclined to follow his position, but that is not what he is doing; he is saying that the atemporality doesn't make sense. But is this true? If God is not burdened by time, acts within time, yet remains outside of time, then while I must admit that I can't comprehend exhaustively the nature of this relationship it does not follow that the position is nonsensical. This may be a good discussion point, but I find this opening part of the argument unpersuasive. As we move along we will find that the argument does get better, but the foundation seems weak to me.
Does not God have to respond to things in time that affect him? Does this present a problem for the Atemporalist? The example used is 1 Kings 21. God responds to Ahab by telling Elijah to prophecy disaster. Ahab repents and God postpones the disaster. How does this make sense if God is outside of time? Feinberg quotes a theologian named Sturch who expresses concern that God has the ability to react to every possible decision man could make (anyone want Ritz Crackers with their Molinsim, anyone?). Feinberg expresses concern over the use of Anthropomorphism at this point, but I would like to stress that one can be an Atemporalist and not hold to Middle knowledge (for those who may not know Molinism and Middle Knowledge are the same thing, and assert that God reacts to every possible decision and scenario man is involved, so man is free to act and God is sovereign. Often times it is used as a theodicy to explain how God cold put someone in a place where they can not hear the gospel and still be held accountable for not accepting it. If God knows every possible decision, then he knows that they will use their freedom to reject the gospel. Thus, he can put them in a part of the world where they will not hear the gospel because they wouldn't believe even if they were in a part of the world where they could hear it. Clearly this is a inter mural controversy within Theism that is outside the scope of this post).
Feinberg does a good job picking up on Sturch's Molinism. My problem with Sturch and Feinberg is this assumption that God is a person in the temporal way that we are persons. Why must God react to be a person? Can his person hood be maintained without all the elements of person hood found in us? I think the answer is: of course. As I stated in the earlier post, we believe that zygotes are a collection of cells that constitute humanity and being and yet they do not have every characteristic sited for person hood in this section of Feinberg's book. The same goes for mentally handicapped. Being is simply not subject to a quantitative catalogue of attributes. I think God can be a being and do greater things than humanity such as create with his spoken word, interrupt cause and effect, and exist outside of time. If I have overlooked something please let me know, but I think these first and second sections of the first argument for God's temporality seem erroneous.

Philosophy and Theology

I apologize for the short post. I was going to continue with God and Eternity but yet another curve ball has come my way, effectively cutting my time from an hour and twenty minutes to merely twenty minutes. This is not nearly enough time to tackle the issue the way I would like to so I will make another attempt tomorrow.

This is a basic question that I have been thinking of for a long time and am looking forward to some counter perspectives. I will frame the question based on Millard Erickson's "Christian Theology" text.

1)Revelation, rather than philosophy, determines our theology
2)Due to this our ontology is informed by revelation rather than philosophy (example: I don't believe in reincarnation because scripture clearly teaches otherwise. An Eastern philosopher may have many philosophical arguments to the contrary, but I do not consider them valid, even if the argument is good, because God has revealed the true nature of reality).
3)No commitment to one philosophical system is necessary even though philosophy is employed in systematic theology.
4)Erickson insists that theology is autonomous from philosophy.
(I highly recommend reading Erickson's text, especially in this section that starts on page 56.)

Even though there is no singular commitment to a philosophical system, does that mean that systematic theology is truly autonomous from philosophy?
Certainly we are not going to check with Sarte to see if we have it right. However, is there some sense where philosophy could fall under the heading of general revelation provided that it does not contradict scripture and that we do not except a philosophical system over a theological one that is rooted in scripture?
There can be no doubt that some of the discoveries of the Greeks were amazing in the sense that they confirmed what scripture had been teaching for thousands of years before them and they didn't have the benefit of scripture to influence them. In "Twilight of Idols" Frederich Nietzsche accuses Plato of going to Egypt and being trained by Rabbinic scholars because his thoughts were so close to what scripture teaches.
Your thoughts?