God, Time, and Eternity VIII

Well, Christmas and New Years are over so it's time to get back to the cerebral grindstone!

Temporal Duration Inadequate for the Ground of All Being
This is a fascinating argument. Two scholars that Feinberg quoted earlier are the main source of this argument which comes to us by way of implication. Temporal duration is only a momentary lapse of genuine duration according to the two scholars. The past has ceased to be and the future has yet to arrive so given the Temporalists position the current moment will be a very short span, or at the very least the status of any given moment is destined to change from the current moment to "the past". Temporal flux demonstrates that everything within time has no permanent status even if it appears to. How does time effect the status of being? How can something exist within a temporal framework and retain the status of immutable being? This seems to imply the need for some permanent actuality rather than a permamnent potentiality that the Temporalist seems to imply. God's being would have a potential future and past. A permanent actuality of being seems impossible if that being's status changes with time. If the being is not within time then this is not a problem.
The Temporalist present two counter arguments:
1) Temporal duration is real temporal duration and the Atemporalist argument makes the Temporalist position out to be a non-genuine temporality. If the object in question does not retain its identity from one moment to the next then there is no genuine duration. How is this? The object in question would have to go out of existence to pass to the next moment. With each passing moment the object would have to cease to exist or completely change. The Temporalist admits to change, but it does not have to be all or nothing. (I could be misunderstanding Feinberg here, but this seems like a disturbing admission, because God is immutable and actual so the degree of change seems irrelevant to me the question is, how could God change at all?)
2) Is permanence better than change? Would not a workable universe be served better by both? (Could God not supply the permanence and time supply the temporary?)

As interesting as this argument is it still only works by implication which is always thorny to deal with.