What is Ontology and why should it concern Christians?
As many of you know my area of study is geared mainly towards philosophy in so much as it concerns Atheism. However, I have discovered that this endeavor requires a great deal of proficiency in general philosophy and all of its constituent branches. The branch I find myself focusing on the most is epistemology and I have enjoyed this focus with little regrets. It has even helped me to understand core doctrines and theology. I have come to enjoy the question "How can I know that there is a God?" Always a fascinating conversation even if my argument is not accepted. In the midst of all of these tedious issues is another branch of philosophy that is replete with assumptions and cavalier attitudes. In many ways it is foundational and there is high stakes for the Christian here. In fact, if more people would study ontology we could communicate matters of faith with a lot less baggage. I can assure you of this, the more one studies ontology, christian or otherwise, the quicker you can get to very important questions and answers.
...and ontology is?
the effort to explain the nature of existence and to describe features that are true of all entities. I should be able to clear these questions up in one post. Okay, maybe not. I think we can at least see why this is a worthy area of study for Christians; but truthfully if everyone studied it we wouldn't have the politicians in office we have now because they would have to be a lot more honest. I believe this study would help anyone. One thing is for sure: the person who studies ontology does not come out the other side the same. It will change your entire thought process. You will not be impressed easily by so called "academics" or "scholars". Why? Because, sadly, many of them have never studied ontology either. These are the same people who believe philosophy to be a synonym for "opinion", that is incorrect. Ask this same person what an opinion is and they will try to give you a philosophically objective answer. These are the type of self defeating thinkers we breed in the academic world. C.S. Lewis in his book "A Pilgrims Regress" speaks of a horse called "Reason" that picked him up and he rode it away from the lies, let us join him.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE?
Have you ever thought about dieing? I am going to assume that it is safe to think you have. What is the scariest element of death? I think it is the idea of nonexistence. I almost do not even care about how I die or whether it will be painful, although these are worthy concerns. Until I became a Christian this idea haunted me. The funny thing is is that I can't even conceive nonexistence. Maybe my fear was really the unknown. What is it for something to exist? Let us do a thought experiment. Imagine something real, say, a bike. Now, let us imagine something not real like a leprechaun. What may be most important to realize, in the study of ontology, is that the bike is real. That is one characteristic the bike has. So the most important difference between the bike and the leprechaun is that the bike exists. Is not this difference as real as any other difference in the world? For example, a red crayon and a blue crayon. David Hume wrote that all things imagined are made up of things that actually do exist. Yet, we still recognize that there are things that are made up and do not exist. The Theist should begin to recognize the importance of this question already. Ask a committed Atheist why he or she does not embrace Agnosticism and you may hear this limerick, "I do not have to know everything about the universe to know there is no Easter Bunny that exists so why do I have to know everything about the universe to know there is no God that exists?" (the answer has to do with necessity and contingency but no room on this post to digress) This is being postulated as warrant for the knowledge that the status of God is that he is made up and does not exist as opposed to other things the Atheist will say does exist(notice how epistemology and ontology are closely related here). Existence is important and brash answers won't due for tough questions. Let us ask deeper questions about the nature of existence.
WHAT IS GENUS?
Similar to the biological use; logic is a branch of philosophy and we find its meaning for our purposes here. A class of individuals or a subgroup having similar attributes. An example may be a group of particulars with univocal essential properties. If you do not study philosophy that may have made no sense so let us say "tables" could be a genus. Everything that is not a table would not share its genus. Is existence a genus all to its self? Do all things exist in the same sense? The answers to these questions are very important. Would you say that a table has a different form of existence to a chair? If simply existence is a genus than it appears not. What about a table compared to the number 6? Is the existence of these two things the same? I am inclined to say no. One exists in a completely different relationship to the other and in a completely different way. Not all are inclined to agree that simple existence is a genus. For example, that table has a multitude of parts. We will use an Aristotelian dichotomy to understand this; these multiple parts should be called "accidental properties". So does the table exist or does the sum of all its parts exist and the table only has the appearance of existence? The accidental properties are there and together they make up what we CALL a table. So the table has existence as long as it has its parts, but once the parts are removed the table ceases to exist and yet the parts continue to have existence. Perhaps there are two different types of existence, or maybe there are different kinds of things that have existence. Is it possible that the two things share in one type of existence and that there is only one type of existence in which all things share? Or are there other options? We will come back to this later.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ONTOLOGICALLY EXISTENTIAL POSTULATES
Many dismiss ancient thinkers because it is assumed that scientific progress will answer all our questions. I have read, with great amusement, Carl Sagan who is very impressed with science and scientists. If I were a Buddhist I would probably be tempted to believe that Richard Dawkins is Sagan reincarnated. However the assumptions that go on unquestioned never cease to amaze me. Gary Gutting, professor at Notre Dame and an expert in philosophy of science, religion and European philosophy states, "Since the ancient Greeks, people reflecting on science have been strongly attracted to the idea that there is a single comprehensive method employed in any genuinely scientific work. We will begin with this idealizing assumption, although we will later encounter ways in which it might be doubted." (pg 423, Blackwell, A Companion to the Philosophy of Science) There is now a gap between the philosopher and the scientist. It has not always been this way, but today it is the state in which we find science. Gutting also points out that the a priori sociological assumptions of scientific inquiry are almost always reflective in the result, making true objectivity questionable. Earlier thinkers were better at investigating scientific methodology because they were also philosophers. My main point is that to dismiss ancient thinkers due to how long ago they were positing their claims amounts to ad hominem (Aaron Sorkin, producer of the West Wing, would do well to take note since this comprised a great portion of his argumentation).
...and what about the history of ontological inquiry?
1)Monism
Parmenides argued for the oneness of all reality. The syllogism for his argument can be summed up:
-Reality can be either one or many.
-If reality is many, then many things must differ from each other.
-However, there are only two ways in which things may differ: by being (something) or non-being (nothing).
-How can something differ by nothing? Either something is something or nothing is nothing, but something cannot be nothing and nothing cannot be something.
-Can something differ by something or being? Being seems to be the only thing that all things have in common, things cannot differ in the very same thing they have in common.
-Things cannot differ at all; everything is one.
Ontological Pluralists do have objections and those will be investigated, but lets continue with our chronological survey. The most famous disciple of Parmenides is Zeno (of Zeno's Paradox). He had further proofs to support Monism.
-If reality is many, then absurdities and impossibilities will follow.
-An example of Zeno's meaning is found in his famous arguments. The most famous is "The Achilles and the Tortoise": The Achilles and the Tortoise are having a race and the Achilles gives the tortoise a head start. After the Tortoise is given a bit of time the Achilles starts and one would expect him to pass the Tortoise and win easily (not so in Zeno land). The Achilles must first pass the half way point in order to pass the Tortoise. Then the Achilles must go to the next half way point, then the next, and the next and so on ad infinitum. The Achilles would never catch the Tortoise because there would always be a mid point to traverse and if reality was many there could never be a singular midway point, but this is an absurdity.
-Given Zeno's proof that there is no such thing as an actual infinite mid point then one can safely conclude that the postulate that "reality is many" is a contradiction and should be considered false.
-Reality must be one.
Is all reality mathematically divisible (further on we will explore the notion of the difference between the "world" and the "universe" so if you have questions after this you may find answers there)? Perhaps some things that one would, and could sustain logically, consider "real" can not be divided at all, say propositions; Can I divide a sphere from a ball? If I divide a body of a human have I also divided the person (again, we will look at in more depth later)? Perhaps there is a point in which things may no longer be split or division reaches its finitude (in math it could not, but that would be a POTENTIAL infinite, we are talking about an ACTUAL infinite)?
In response to Parmenides, some have insisted that non-being is a real difference to being and that Parmenides's point needs further substantiation. Some also think that things can differ in being as well. Both entities can be said to posses being while have a different type of being (hold your questions these objections may become more clear later). The most condemning argument against Parmenides is a logical fallacy in his 5th premise; "things cannot differ in the very same thing they have in common" assumes that all things are the same and begs the question. He may as well said "All things are the same because they are the same and that is what they have in common and therefore cannot differ." This is Circular Reasoning.
The next view is Pluralism or "reality is many". The atomists and the Platonists accepted this position.
Atomists felt that things differed by absolute non-being. Their argument was that reality is made up of innumerable and indivisible atoms which fill the void of space. The atoms differed in size, shape, and space. Each atom ontologically possessed its own position in space and the emptiness or non-being around each atom defined the atom by this non-being. The absolute nothingness around each atom defined each atoms difference by absolute non-being. Being could be recognized by non-being. How could nothing cause differentiation? When was the last time nothing caused anything. If my kid is quiet for too long and I ask what she is doing and she says nothing, I know something is going on. Nothing does not cause something and so differing by nothing is akin to not differing at all. We would be doing our selves a disservice not to recognize that indeed atoms have been split. We should also mention super string theory at this point as well.
Saturday, August 22, 2009
Sunday, August 16, 2009
God, Time, and Eternity X, Part 3
As God takes action outside of time and corresponding action happens in time, how should we understand the many reactions that are performed in a monolithic, atemporal reality (if reaction is a theologically correct term in this case)? In other words, how could God act once to the many actions that an individual makes? After all, there is no time to make actions so there must be one singular deed, not multiple sequential actions. Feinberg admits that this is no problem for the advocates of Middle Knowledge by its self. However, could one hold to Atemporality and Middle Knowledge without problems?
Atemporality holds that God does all actions timelessly and plans all actions to occur at the time of his choosing. keep in mind that the Atemporalist is not saying that these "reactions" happen simply before the given event, time has no meaning here, there is a timeless "reaction" or simple action outside of time. God must do many things in response to every possible action that is going to take place (I fear that Feinberg is assuming that these "reactions" are taking place before a person's choices which is incorrect, but take this critique with a grain of salt). The first point Feinberg makes concerning this problem is that God would be left with a great many unused actions. I have to say that I am puzzled over Feinberg's criticism. I am on the fence as far as middle knowledge is concerned, but this seems like it misunderstands Middle Knowledge. The point isn't that God knows AND does all possible outcomes, it is that he KNOWS all possible outcomes and what would happen otherwise. But, to react to what does not happen is not omniscience, that would be divine speculation (some call Middle Knowledge "Divine Speculation", but I believe this leads to a false understanding of omniscience, the backer of Middle Knowledge is not in danger of the heresy of Open Theism) and that is not the postulate of Middle Knowledge. God knows whether a person would act favorably or unfavorably, say to the gospel, in every possible scenario. If the person would ultimately reject the gospel then God is in keeping with his own character to place this person in a position that seems far removed from the possibility of salvation. God did not DO every possible thing before this person was placed in a remote region outside of earshot of the gospel. God only did in "response" to what he KNEW the person would do. I believe, therefor, that the advocate of Middle Knowledge is in no danger logically to hold to atemporality and Middle Knowledge, Feinberg's critique finds no purchase here. It does not compromise Middle Knowledge, atemporality or a synthesis there of. Feinberg also notes that this problem's propensity increases when libertarian free will is introduced, but again, I believe that he has couched an incorrect definition of Middle Knowledge at the apex of his argument.
Feinberg moves on to the issue of personhood. The first thing he states is that the atemporalist may respond that the notion of personhood is not easily defined. A point well taken in my opinion. Then Feinberg refers to a theologian named William Mann who further appeals to Danial Dennet, yes the Atheist not the fire juggler, whom gives 6 criterion for personhood.
1) A is rational
2) A is a being which states of consciousness can be attributed
3) Others regard or can regard A as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed
4) A is capable as regarding others as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed
5) A is capable of verbal communication
6) A is self-conscience; i.e., A is capable or regarding him/her/its self as subject to states of consciousness
This is a list that Peter Singer and other abortion/euthanasia advocates would love to champion as the quintessential definition of personhood. This definition would serve any eugenics program well. I, however, have a much more liberal interpretation of personhood which includes bearing the image of God. But wait! Don't you have to assume the bible to be true in order to maintain this position? I never said I would use it as an isolated apologetic, but among Christian theists, I see no problem. Does one need to meet this criteria to achieve personhood? Not in my opinion. Does God need to meet this criteria to be a person. I think he does meet it, however I'm not sure that he needs to. Which brings me back to the point that Feinberg dismisses, are we ready to give rigid terms and conditions to personhood? In many cases I think not. But, I also have to admit that Feinberg's argument may still stand in light of the fact that certainly God meets these criteria even if the unborn does not. So I will grant him the argument to continue.
Feinberg is one of the most responsible scholars I have ever read, in fact he has inspired me to do likewise. He doesn't let me down here either, as he urges caution with this definition of personhood. However, God does meet this definition and except for provision 1 and 5 Feinberg sees no hope for the atemporalist to survive the critique of person in regard to numbers 2,3,4, and 6. An atemporal person should be able to do these things. The list Feinberg gives is as follows: intending, purposing, remembering, forgetting, responding to prayer, becoming angry, rejoicing, and being effected by actions of others. I am once again puzzled. Why does God have to do these things the same way man does? In fact, some of these things are simply anthropomorphisms despite Feinberg's attempts to say otherwise. Cannot God respond to prayer in perfection, rather than in reaction? I can't recall a time in scripture when remembering or forgetting, in reference to God, meant anything less than perfect forgetfulness. What does that mean? That God no longer counts sin against us AS IF he had forgotten something. What happens when someone forgets a date? They don't go on it. What happens when God forgets sin? He does not punish , as if it had never happened or as if there was a sin to remember in the first place. AND YET, God does indeed remember otherwise he would have no need for his covenants. We count on him remembering even when he so called "forgets" because we rely on his justice. I see no reason to give up the traditional understanding of God's relationship to time as atemporal because of what is clearly meant to be understood as analogies for the human cerebral palate. Additionally, it seems that Feinberg simply assumes that because there are things that require action in time for humans that this carries over for God because it is difficult to understand otherwise. Why should this bother us; we can not understand God exhaustively and there has been no readily ascertainable contradictions that are worthy of note.
Atemporality holds that God does all actions timelessly and plans all actions to occur at the time of his choosing. keep in mind that the Atemporalist is not saying that these "reactions" happen simply before the given event, time has no meaning here, there is a timeless "reaction" or simple action outside of time. God must do many things in response to every possible action that is going to take place (I fear that Feinberg is assuming that these "reactions" are taking place before a person's choices which is incorrect, but take this critique with a grain of salt). The first point Feinberg makes concerning this problem is that God would be left with a great many unused actions. I have to say that I am puzzled over Feinberg's criticism. I am on the fence as far as middle knowledge is concerned, but this seems like it misunderstands Middle Knowledge. The point isn't that God knows AND does all possible outcomes, it is that he KNOWS all possible outcomes and what would happen otherwise. But, to react to what does not happen is not omniscience, that would be divine speculation (some call Middle Knowledge "Divine Speculation", but I believe this leads to a false understanding of omniscience, the backer of Middle Knowledge is not in danger of the heresy of Open Theism) and that is not the postulate of Middle Knowledge. God knows whether a person would act favorably or unfavorably, say to the gospel, in every possible scenario. If the person would ultimately reject the gospel then God is in keeping with his own character to place this person in a position that seems far removed from the possibility of salvation. God did not DO every possible thing before this person was placed in a remote region outside of earshot of the gospel. God only did in "response" to what he KNEW the person would do. I believe, therefor, that the advocate of Middle Knowledge is in no danger logically to hold to atemporality and Middle Knowledge, Feinberg's critique finds no purchase here. It does not compromise Middle Knowledge, atemporality or a synthesis there of. Feinberg also notes that this problem's propensity increases when libertarian free will is introduced, but again, I believe that he has couched an incorrect definition of Middle Knowledge at the apex of his argument.
Feinberg moves on to the issue of personhood. The first thing he states is that the atemporalist may respond that the notion of personhood is not easily defined. A point well taken in my opinion. Then Feinberg refers to a theologian named William Mann who further appeals to Danial Dennet, yes the Atheist not the fire juggler, whom gives 6 criterion for personhood.
1) A is rational
2) A is a being which states of consciousness can be attributed
3) Others regard or can regard A as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed
4) A is capable as regarding others as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed
5) A is capable of verbal communication
6) A is self-conscience; i.e., A is capable or regarding him/her/its self as subject to states of consciousness
This is a list that Peter Singer and other abortion/euthanasia advocates would love to champion as the quintessential definition of personhood. This definition would serve any eugenics program well. I, however, have a much more liberal interpretation of personhood which includes bearing the image of God. But wait! Don't you have to assume the bible to be true in order to maintain this position? I never said I would use it as an isolated apologetic, but among Christian theists, I see no problem. Does one need to meet this criteria to achieve personhood? Not in my opinion. Does God need to meet this criteria to be a person. I think he does meet it, however I'm not sure that he needs to. Which brings me back to the point that Feinberg dismisses, are we ready to give rigid terms and conditions to personhood? In many cases I think not. But, I also have to admit that Feinberg's argument may still stand in light of the fact that certainly God meets these criteria even if the unborn does not. So I will grant him the argument to continue.
Feinberg is one of the most responsible scholars I have ever read, in fact he has inspired me to do likewise. He doesn't let me down here either, as he urges caution with this definition of personhood. However, God does meet this definition and except for provision 1 and 5 Feinberg sees no hope for the atemporalist to survive the critique of person in regard to numbers 2,3,4, and 6. An atemporal person should be able to do these things. The list Feinberg gives is as follows: intending, purposing, remembering, forgetting, responding to prayer, becoming angry, rejoicing, and being effected by actions of others. I am once again puzzled. Why does God have to do these things the same way man does? In fact, some of these things are simply anthropomorphisms despite Feinberg's attempts to say otherwise. Cannot God respond to prayer in perfection, rather than in reaction? I can't recall a time in scripture when remembering or forgetting, in reference to God, meant anything less than perfect forgetfulness. What does that mean? That God no longer counts sin against us AS IF he had forgotten something. What happens when someone forgets a date? They don't go on it. What happens when God forgets sin? He does not punish , as if it had never happened or as if there was a sin to remember in the first place. AND YET, God does indeed remember otherwise he would have no need for his covenants. We count on him remembering even when he so called "forgets" because we rely on his justice. I see no reason to give up the traditional understanding of God's relationship to time as atemporal because of what is clearly meant to be understood as analogies for the human cerebral palate. Additionally, it seems that Feinberg simply assumes that because there are things that require action in time for humans that this carries over for God because it is difficult to understand otherwise. Why should this bother us; we can not understand God exhaustively and there has been no readily ascertainable contradictions that are worthy of note.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
God, Time, and Eternity X, Part 2
How are we to understand God's ability to react to events in time or does God react? What do we make of God's person hood as we try to answer this question?
Can an atemporal being know what time it is in a time laden world? Feinberg seems to think that any answer that maintains atemporality will be dubious. Atmeporalists maintain that this question is not relevant because God's activities are timeless and then has the effects of his activity occur within time and with perfect precision. Feinberg insists that this answer makes no sense. I have to say that I think that this hardly constitutes throwing out the Atemporal position. There are many matters in Theism that I can not exhaustively understand, but I do not discount them. If Feinberg was sighting a contradiction then I would be more inclined to follow his position, but that is not what he is doing; he is saying that the atemporality doesn't make sense. But is this true? If God is not burdened by time, acts within time, yet remains outside of time, then while I must admit that I can't comprehend exhaustively the nature of this relationship it does not follow that the position is nonsensical. This may be a good discussion point, but I find this opening part of the argument unpersuasive. As we move along we will find that the argument does get better, but the foundation seems weak to me.
Does not God have to respond to things in time that affect him? Does this present a problem for the Atemporalist? The example used is 1 Kings 21. God responds to Ahab by telling Elijah to prophecy disaster. Ahab repents and God postpones the disaster. How does this make sense if God is outside of time? Feinberg quotes a theologian named Sturch who expresses concern that God has the ability to react to every possible decision man could make (anyone want Ritz Crackers with their Molinsim, anyone?). Feinberg expresses concern over the use of Anthropomorphism at this point, but I would like to stress that one can be an Atemporalist and not hold to Middle knowledge (for those who may not know Molinism and Middle Knowledge are the same thing, and assert that God reacts to every possible decision and scenario man is involved, so man is free to act and God is sovereign. Often times it is used as a theodicy to explain how God cold put someone in a place where they can not hear the gospel and still be held accountable for not accepting it. If God knows every possible decision, then he knows that they will use their freedom to reject the gospel. Thus, he can put them in a part of the world where they will not hear the gospel because they wouldn't believe even if they were in a part of the world where they could hear it. Clearly this is a inter mural controversy within Theism that is outside the scope of this post).
Feinberg does a good job picking up on Sturch's Molinism. My problem with Sturch and Feinberg is this assumption that God is a person in the temporal way that we are persons. Why must God react to be a person? Can his person hood be maintained without all the elements of person hood found in us? I think the answer is: of course. As I stated in the earlier post, we believe that zygotes are a collection of cells that constitute humanity and being and yet they do not have every characteristic sited for person hood in this section of Feinberg's book. The same goes for mentally handicapped. Being is simply not subject to a quantitative catalogue of attributes. I think God can be a being and do greater things than humanity such as create with his spoken word, interrupt cause and effect, and exist outside of time. If I have overlooked something please let me know, but I think these first and second sections of the first argument for God's temporality seem erroneous.
Can an atemporal being know what time it is in a time laden world? Feinberg seems to think that any answer that maintains atemporality will be dubious. Atmeporalists maintain that this question is not relevant because God's activities are timeless and then has the effects of his activity occur within time and with perfect precision. Feinberg insists that this answer makes no sense. I have to say that I think that this hardly constitutes throwing out the Atemporal position. There are many matters in Theism that I can not exhaustively understand, but I do not discount them. If Feinberg was sighting a contradiction then I would be more inclined to follow his position, but that is not what he is doing; he is saying that the atemporality doesn't make sense. But is this true? If God is not burdened by time, acts within time, yet remains outside of time, then while I must admit that I can't comprehend exhaustively the nature of this relationship it does not follow that the position is nonsensical. This may be a good discussion point, but I find this opening part of the argument unpersuasive. As we move along we will find that the argument does get better, but the foundation seems weak to me.
Does not God have to respond to things in time that affect him? Does this present a problem for the Atemporalist? The example used is 1 Kings 21. God responds to Ahab by telling Elijah to prophecy disaster. Ahab repents and God postpones the disaster. How does this make sense if God is outside of time? Feinberg quotes a theologian named Sturch who expresses concern that God has the ability to react to every possible decision man could make (anyone want Ritz Crackers with their Molinsim, anyone?). Feinberg expresses concern over the use of Anthropomorphism at this point, but I would like to stress that one can be an Atemporalist and not hold to Middle knowledge (for those who may not know Molinism and Middle Knowledge are the same thing, and assert that God reacts to every possible decision and scenario man is involved, so man is free to act and God is sovereign. Often times it is used as a theodicy to explain how God cold put someone in a place where they can not hear the gospel and still be held accountable for not accepting it. If God knows every possible decision, then he knows that they will use their freedom to reject the gospel. Thus, he can put them in a part of the world where they will not hear the gospel because they wouldn't believe even if they were in a part of the world where they could hear it. Clearly this is a inter mural controversy within Theism that is outside the scope of this post).
Feinberg does a good job picking up on Sturch's Molinism. My problem with Sturch and Feinberg is this assumption that God is a person in the temporal way that we are persons. Why must God react to be a person? Can his person hood be maintained without all the elements of person hood found in us? I think the answer is: of course. As I stated in the earlier post, we believe that zygotes are a collection of cells that constitute humanity and being and yet they do not have every characteristic sited for person hood in this section of Feinberg's book. The same goes for mentally handicapped. Being is simply not subject to a quantitative catalogue of attributes. I think God can be a being and do greater things than humanity such as create with his spoken word, interrupt cause and effect, and exist outside of time. If I have overlooked something please let me know, but I think these first and second sections of the first argument for God's temporality seem erroneous.
Monday, May 11, 2009
Philosophy and Theology
I apologize for the short post. I was going to continue with God and Eternity but yet another curve ball has come my way, effectively cutting my time from an hour and twenty minutes to merely twenty minutes. This is not nearly enough time to tackle the issue the way I would like to so I will make another attempt tomorrow.
This is a basic question that I have been thinking of for a long time and am looking forward to some counter perspectives. I will frame the question based on Millard Erickson's "Christian Theology" text.
1)Revelation, rather than philosophy, determines our theology
2)Due to this our ontology is informed by revelation rather than philosophy (example: I don't believe in reincarnation because scripture clearly teaches otherwise. An Eastern philosopher may have many philosophical arguments to the contrary, but I do not consider them valid, even if the argument is good, because God has revealed the true nature of reality).
3)No commitment to one philosophical system is necessary even though philosophy is employed in systematic theology.
4)Erickson insists that theology is autonomous from philosophy.
(I highly recommend reading Erickson's text, especially in this section that starts on page 56.)
Even though there is no singular commitment to a philosophical system, does that mean that systematic theology is truly autonomous from philosophy?
Certainly we are not going to check with Sarte to see if we have it right. However, is there some sense where philosophy could fall under the heading of general revelation provided that it does not contradict scripture and that we do not except a philosophical system over a theological one that is rooted in scripture?
There can be no doubt that some of the discoveries of the Greeks were amazing in the sense that they confirmed what scripture had been teaching for thousands of years before them and they didn't have the benefit of scripture to influence them. In "Twilight of Idols" Frederich Nietzsche accuses Plato of going to Egypt and being trained by Rabbinic scholars because his thoughts were so close to what scripture teaches.
Your thoughts?
This is a basic question that I have been thinking of for a long time and am looking forward to some counter perspectives. I will frame the question based on Millard Erickson's "Christian Theology" text.
1)Revelation, rather than philosophy, determines our theology
2)Due to this our ontology is informed by revelation rather than philosophy (example: I don't believe in reincarnation because scripture clearly teaches otherwise. An Eastern philosopher may have many philosophical arguments to the contrary, but I do not consider them valid, even if the argument is good, because God has revealed the true nature of reality).
3)No commitment to one philosophical system is necessary even though philosophy is employed in systematic theology.
4)Erickson insists that theology is autonomous from philosophy.
(I highly recommend reading Erickson's text, especially in this section that starts on page 56.)
Even though there is no singular commitment to a philosophical system, does that mean that systematic theology is truly autonomous from philosophy?
Certainly we are not going to check with Sarte to see if we have it right. However, is there some sense where philosophy could fall under the heading of general revelation provided that it does not contradict scripture and that we do not except a philosophical system over a theological one that is rooted in scripture?
There can be no doubt that some of the discoveries of the Greeks were amazing in the sense that they confirmed what scripture had been teaching for thousands of years before them and they didn't have the benefit of scripture to influence them. In "Twilight of Idols" Frederich Nietzsche accuses Plato of going to Egypt and being trained by Rabbinic scholars because his thoughts were so close to what scripture teaches.
Your thoughts?
Sunday, March 29, 2009
From the hit show Friends: an Empiricist/Rationalist VS. Postmodern/New Ager
Before you read: copy and paste the link below to your browser and watch (great clip, pretty funny!).
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nfcs3BBrRbU&feature=related
Who won the debate? It seems as if Ross gave up, and yet we are left feeling as if this issue is unresolved. Didn't Phoebe win; after all Ross was left with nothing to say. Didn't Ross present impenetrable evidence for his position? Let's take a closer look.
Ross represents the Empiricist and the Rationalist. What are these two positions exactly? I'm glad you asked.
Empiricism: Any view which bases our knowledge, or the materials from which it is constructed (such as gray matter, eyes, ears and the corresponding outside world being perceived)on experience through the traditional five senses(The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, pg.226).
Ross is also assuming Rationalism.
Rationalism: Stresses reason as the means of determining truth.
In some ways Rationalism is in conflict with Empiricism if Empiricism is taken in the classical sense in which the mind is a blank slate or a tabula rasa in which the world foists data onto the mind and determines what is believed. A strict Rationalist will give the mind authority over the senses or what is known as
"a priori" or rationality before what is sensed. Why is Ross both? Well, Ross has a synthesis that is assumed in his argumentation but it is interesting to note that Ross gives up the debate when Phoebe appeals to a possible flaw in Ross's Empiricism (not to mention the liberal producers of the show would probably not let a male win the debate over a female, although I question whether Ross is really a male throughout the course of the show). If all the data points to Ross's conclusion how could he possibly be wrong? Because the data does not necessarily affirm his Rationalism. Possibly his biggest flaw is not choosing one over the other, but the producers of the show are lay persons when it comes to philosophy so its not necessary to speculate too much on this. We will chew on this a bit later when I dissect the dialogue.
Phoebe represents the Postmodern New Ager.
Postmodernism: This is a view that is suspicious of any metanarratives or systemic worldviews. It emphasizes the inadequacy of the human mind to achieve true knowledge. It sees any truth claims or positions about the definition of the universe as culturally relative and nominal and suspects that the propagation of "reason" or "truth" or "science" is in fact a facade to suppress others for the cause of domination.
New Age Movement: For the most part this view emphasizes the influx of Eastern philosophy (Pantheism, Buddhism, Panentheism, etc.) into the Western Mind set. While it is not readily apparent from the dialogue or clip, Phoebe is well known for embracing a litany of eastern modes and tropes which fit very neatly into her Postmodern schematic. Why does it coalesce so well? Because much of Eastern thought rejects "Western Rationality".
Ahhh, don't you miss the 90's?!
PHOEBE: I'm sorry, but sometimes they need help. That's fine. Go ahead and scoff. You know, there're a lot of things that I don't believe in, but that doesn't mean they're not true.
JOEY: Such as?
PHOEBE: Like crop circles, or the Bermuda triangle, or evolution?
{Notice evolution is lobbed in with two well known conspiracy theories. I believe this is done for dramatic effect to contrast Ross's position more effectively.}
ROSS: Whoa, whoa, whoa. What, you don't, uh, you don't believe in evolution?
PHOEBE: Nah. Not really.
ROSS: You don't believe in evolution?
PHOEBE: I don't know, it's just, you know...monkeys, Darwin, you know, it's a, it's a nice story, I just think it's a little too easy.
{A nice story or metanarrative or worldview and because it is no more than this it is debatable according to Phoebe's postmodernism.}
ROSS: Too easy? Too...The process of every living thing on this planet evolving over millions of years from single-celled organisms, too easy?
{Not so much easy as it is too explanatory, while I believe that Ross's position is the wrong explanation Ross clearly is struggling with the notion that one would have the gall to disagree at all. For Phoebe, evolution is too easy because it claims to explain things which Postmodernists reject as culturally relative. Any explanation is too easy because this complex world is too much for puny human minds.}
PHOEBE: Yeah, I just don't buy it.
ROSS: Uh, excuse me. Evolution is not for you to buy, Phoebe. Evolution is scientific fact, like, like, like the air we breathe, like gravity.
{I imagine even most full blown Darwin wanna be scientists like Richard Dawkins even scoffed at this one. For the lay person this argument may hold some water but for anyone studied on the issue it is no more than rhetorical posturing. First, what makes it scientific fact according to Ross? Water, gravity = empirical data = Empiricism. There is a logical fallacy here and that is the Law of the Excluded Middle. In no way is evolution similar to gravity or oxygen, these can be tested and observed (at least by proxy through effects). This may sound like splitting hairs, but I assure you not recognizing the difference is a critical error. Ross's argument is essentially: Gravity is affirmed by science and evolution is affirmed by science so it must be scientific fact. This is preposterous, in no way has evolution ever been confirmed in any remote sense the same way gravity has. This fallacy is similar to saying, Chickens have legs I have legs therefor I am a chicken. Additionally, I am giving Ross the benefit of the doubt to say that evolution is confirmed by science, it may be confirmed by scientists, but that is a whole other animal. Scientists are fallible humans with fallible agendas. There is a lot more that could be argued here but I must move on, suffice it to say evolution is a contested theory and nothing more and for you the reader if this is not enough please post a response or rebuttal and I will deal with individual issues at that time.}
PHOEBE: Ok, don't get me started on gravity.
ROSS: You uh, you don't believe in gravity?
PHOEBE: Well, it's not so much that you know, like I don't believe in it, you know, it's just...I don't know, lately I get the feeling that I'm not so much being pulled down as I am being pushed.
LATER...
ROSS: How can you not believe in evolution?
PHOEBE: Just don't. Look at this funky shirt!
ROSS: Pheebs, I have studied evolution my entire adult life. Ok, I can tell you, we have collected fossils from all over the world that actually show the evolution of different species, ok? You can literally see them evolving through time.
PHOEBE: Really? You can actually see it?
ROSS: You bet. In the U.S., China, Africa, all over.
PHOEBE: See, I didn't know that.
ROSS: Well, there you go.
{This is one of the most important axioms in the evolutionist's argument and yet their weakest and most glossed over. A reminder: Ross introduces more empirical data, but I use the term loosely because there is not full disclosure in Ross's argument. Much of the confusion in evolution is found in the difference in micro and macro evolution. I, nor should any Christian, doubt micro evolution. We have all seen variations within species. In fact, one apologetic for Noah's Arc is that he took two of each "kind" (not species, which is an important distinction) and micro evolution worked from there. But when evidence for the micro is used to try to affirm the macro one should pause. Is Ross doing that? No. However, the fossils Ross is speaking of hardly qualify as a fossil record. It is more like fossil conjecture. Further study into this will show that transitional fossils are practically non-existent. The ones that have been "found" are little more that a few parts and a lot of drawings and imagination. (Google "transitional fossil" and try to find more than a catalogue of skulls, single itemized bones and tons of drawings. Then type "dinosaur fossils" and look at the robust evidence of these pre-human fossils. The "fossil record" of Ross's begins to look pretty weak.)Some scientists have noticed this problem and realized they are being called on their "Ross" argument so they hypothesize Punctuated Equilibrium (long waiting periods, then a boom of evolutionary growth) or other hypotheses to make certain that evolution is "scientific fact" at all costs. These efforts have been noted by William Dempsky as shooting an arrow then drawing the target around it after it hits the wall: a bulls eye every time.}
PHOEBE: Huh. So now, the real question is, who put those fossils there, and why?
LATER...
ROSS: Ok, Pheebs. See how I'm making these little toys move? Opposable thumbs. Without evolution, how do you explain opposable thumbs?
PHOEBE: Maybe the overlords needed them to steer their spacecrafts.
ROSS: Please tell me you're joking.
PHOEBE: Look, can't we just say that you believe in something, and I don't.
{Why does Ross have to be such an oppressor? More of Phoebe's Postmodernity.}
ROSS: No, no, Pheebs, we can't, ok, because its like math, one plus one equals two. I can't stand by and let you think one plus one might equal three or four or yellow.
{Here is Ross's Rationalism. Notice now that Ross has conveniently made Evolution equal to logic and mathematics. Do I really need to expand on this to demonstrate how clearly false this argument is? All I will say is that math and logic are unchanging or static. What would Ross say produces these unchangeable facts? He would say the human brain, but how are they unchanging reliable truths if they are originated in a changing, dynamic brain? The cause must be greater than the effect and if the genesis for the laws of logic were produced by something that is in constant flux they too would be in constant flux. Ross's argument is self refuting (so is any other evolutionary argument)he is essentially saying that the ever changing evolution is an unchanging reality and yet all logic is within the changing human brain and yet retains its unchanging nature, very dogmatic and contradictory. Even Carl Sagan when he wrote Contact admits that math would be a universal language, and so would logic.}
PHOEBE: What is this obsessive need you have to make everyone agree with you? No, what's that all about? I think, I think maybe it's time you put Ross under the microscope.
{Again, why does Ross have to be such an oppressor? Yet more of Phoebe's Postmodernity.}
ROSS: Is there blood coming out of my ears?
LATER...
PHOEBE: Uh-oh. It's Scary Scientist Man.
ROSS: Ok, Phoebe, this is it. In this briefcase I carry actual scientific facts. A briefcase of facts, if you will. Some of these fossils are over 200 million years old.
PHOEBE: Ok, look, before you even start, I'm not denying evolution, ok, I'm just saying that it's one of the possibilities.
{There are many metanarratives why should one be greater by being true?}
ROSS: It's the only possibility, Phoebe.
PHOEBE: Ok, Ross, could you just open your mind like this much, ok? Wasn't there a time when the brightest minds in the world believed that the world was flat? And, up until like what, 50 years ago, you all thought the atom was the smallest thing, until you split it open, and this like, whole mess of crap came out. Now, are you telling me that you are so unbelievably arrogant that you can't admit that there's a teeny tiny possibility that you could be wrong about this?
{Scientists have made mistakes so they can't be trusted according to Phoebe. There is still progress yet to be made so science can not be trusted according to Phoebe. Lastly, Ross is morally flawed (arrogant) for believing his views to be true. Postmodernism}
ROSS: There might be, a teeny, tiny, possibility.
PHOEBE: I can't believe you caved.
ROSS: What?
PHOEBE: You just abandoned your whole belief system. I mean, before, I didn't agree with you, but at least I respected you. How, how, how are you going to go into work tomorrow? How, how are you going to face the other science guys? How, how are you going to face yourself? Oh! That was fun. So who's hungry?
{Ross loses due to the rhetorical leverage gained by Phoebe's attack on Ross's epistemology, which states that there are no doubts when there is overwhelming empirical data. Ross's rationalism failed for it could not be supported by the assumptions of Empiricism. Once Ross conceded doubt he did so on the grounds that the empirical data alone would not suffice and because he grouped the rationality of logic as part of evolution his Rationalism failed as well. Winner: Phoebe, who is actually a loser as well because she assumes that her position (that all views should be treated as equally plausible) is true and because no position can claim to be true then this would include her own making it false. So the real winner is: you if you do not embrace either of these false views, congratulations! You win a copy of 1984!}
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nfcs3BBrRbU&feature=related
Who won the debate? It seems as if Ross gave up, and yet we are left feeling as if this issue is unresolved. Didn't Phoebe win; after all Ross was left with nothing to say. Didn't Ross present impenetrable evidence for his position? Let's take a closer look.
Ross represents the Empiricist and the Rationalist. What are these two positions exactly? I'm glad you asked.
Empiricism: Any view which bases our knowledge, or the materials from which it is constructed (such as gray matter, eyes, ears and the corresponding outside world being perceived)on experience through the traditional five senses(The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, pg.226).
Ross is also assuming Rationalism.
Rationalism: Stresses reason as the means of determining truth.
In some ways Rationalism is in conflict with Empiricism if Empiricism is taken in the classical sense in which the mind is a blank slate or a tabula rasa in which the world foists data onto the mind and determines what is believed. A strict Rationalist will give the mind authority over the senses or what is known as
"a priori" or rationality before what is sensed. Why is Ross both? Well, Ross has a synthesis that is assumed in his argumentation but it is interesting to note that Ross gives up the debate when Phoebe appeals to a possible flaw in Ross's Empiricism (not to mention the liberal producers of the show would probably not let a male win the debate over a female, although I question whether Ross is really a male throughout the course of the show). If all the data points to Ross's conclusion how could he possibly be wrong? Because the data does not necessarily affirm his Rationalism. Possibly his biggest flaw is not choosing one over the other, but the producers of the show are lay persons when it comes to philosophy so its not necessary to speculate too much on this. We will chew on this a bit later when I dissect the dialogue.
Phoebe represents the Postmodern New Ager.
Postmodernism: This is a view that is suspicious of any metanarratives or systemic worldviews. It emphasizes the inadequacy of the human mind to achieve true knowledge. It sees any truth claims or positions about the definition of the universe as culturally relative and nominal and suspects that the propagation of "reason" or "truth" or "science" is in fact a facade to suppress others for the cause of domination.
New Age Movement: For the most part this view emphasizes the influx of Eastern philosophy (Pantheism, Buddhism, Panentheism, etc.) into the Western Mind set. While it is not readily apparent from the dialogue or clip, Phoebe is well known for embracing a litany of eastern modes and tropes which fit very neatly into her Postmodern schematic. Why does it coalesce so well? Because much of Eastern thought rejects "Western Rationality".
Ahhh, don't you miss the 90's?!
PHOEBE: I'm sorry, but sometimes they need help. That's fine. Go ahead and scoff. You know, there're a lot of things that I don't believe in, but that doesn't mean they're not true.
JOEY: Such as?
PHOEBE: Like crop circles, or the Bermuda triangle, or evolution?
{Notice evolution is lobbed in with two well known conspiracy theories. I believe this is done for dramatic effect to contrast Ross's position more effectively.}
ROSS: Whoa, whoa, whoa. What, you don't, uh, you don't believe in evolution?
PHOEBE: Nah. Not really.
ROSS: You don't believe in evolution?
PHOEBE: I don't know, it's just, you know...monkeys, Darwin, you know, it's a, it's a nice story, I just think it's a little too easy.
{A nice story or metanarrative or worldview and because it is no more than this it is debatable according to Phoebe's postmodernism.}
ROSS: Too easy? Too...The process of every living thing on this planet evolving over millions of years from single-celled organisms, too easy?
{Not so much easy as it is too explanatory, while I believe that Ross's position is the wrong explanation Ross clearly is struggling with the notion that one would have the gall to disagree at all. For Phoebe, evolution is too easy because it claims to explain things which Postmodernists reject as culturally relative. Any explanation is too easy because this complex world is too much for puny human minds.}
PHOEBE: Yeah, I just don't buy it.
ROSS: Uh, excuse me. Evolution is not for you to buy, Phoebe. Evolution is scientific fact, like, like, like the air we breathe, like gravity.
{I imagine even most full blown Darwin wanna be scientists like Richard Dawkins even scoffed at this one. For the lay person this argument may hold some water but for anyone studied on the issue it is no more than rhetorical posturing. First, what makes it scientific fact according to Ross? Water, gravity = empirical data = Empiricism. There is a logical fallacy here and that is the Law of the Excluded Middle. In no way is evolution similar to gravity or oxygen, these can be tested and observed (at least by proxy through effects). This may sound like splitting hairs, but I assure you not recognizing the difference is a critical error. Ross's argument is essentially: Gravity is affirmed by science and evolution is affirmed by science so it must be scientific fact. This is preposterous, in no way has evolution ever been confirmed in any remote sense the same way gravity has. This fallacy is similar to saying, Chickens have legs I have legs therefor I am a chicken. Additionally, I am giving Ross the benefit of the doubt to say that evolution is confirmed by science, it may be confirmed by scientists, but that is a whole other animal. Scientists are fallible humans with fallible agendas. There is a lot more that could be argued here but I must move on, suffice it to say evolution is a contested theory and nothing more and for you the reader if this is not enough please post a response or rebuttal and I will deal with individual issues at that time.}
PHOEBE: Ok, don't get me started on gravity.
ROSS: You uh, you don't believe in gravity?
PHOEBE: Well, it's not so much that you know, like I don't believe in it, you know, it's just...I don't know, lately I get the feeling that I'm not so much being pulled down as I am being pushed.
LATER...
ROSS: How can you not believe in evolution?
PHOEBE: Just don't. Look at this funky shirt!
ROSS: Pheebs, I have studied evolution my entire adult life. Ok, I can tell you, we have collected fossils from all over the world that actually show the evolution of different species, ok? You can literally see them evolving through time.
PHOEBE: Really? You can actually see it?
ROSS: You bet. In the U.S., China, Africa, all over.
PHOEBE: See, I didn't know that.
ROSS: Well, there you go.
{This is one of the most important axioms in the evolutionist's argument and yet their weakest and most glossed over. A reminder: Ross introduces more empirical data, but I use the term loosely because there is not full disclosure in Ross's argument. Much of the confusion in evolution is found in the difference in micro and macro evolution. I, nor should any Christian, doubt micro evolution. We have all seen variations within species. In fact, one apologetic for Noah's Arc is that he took two of each "kind" (not species, which is an important distinction) and micro evolution worked from there. But when evidence for the micro is used to try to affirm the macro one should pause. Is Ross doing that? No. However, the fossils Ross is speaking of hardly qualify as a fossil record. It is more like fossil conjecture. Further study into this will show that transitional fossils are practically non-existent. The ones that have been "found" are little more that a few parts and a lot of drawings and imagination. (Google "transitional fossil" and try to find more than a catalogue of skulls, single itemized bones and tons of drawings. Then type "dinosaur fossils" and look at the robust evidence of these pre-human fossils. The "fossil record" of Ross's begins to look pretty weak.)Some scientists have noticed this problem and realized they are being called on their "Ross" argument so they hypothesize Punctuated Equilibrium (long waiting periods, then a boom of evolutionary growth) or other hypotheses to make certain that evolution is "scientific fact" at all costs. These efforts have been noted by William Dempsky as shooting an arrow then drawing the target around it after it hits the wall: a bulls eye every time.}
PHOEBE: Huh. So now, the real question is, who put those fossils there, and why?
LATER...
ROSS: Ok, Pheebs. See how I'm making these little toys move? Opposable thumbs. Without evolution, how do you explain opposable thumbs?
PHOEBE: Maybe the overlords needed them to steer their spacecrafts.
ROSS: Please tell me you're joking.
PHOEBE: Look, can't we just say that you believe in something, and I don't.
{Why does Ross have to be such an oppressor? More of Phoebe's Postmodernity.}
ROSS: No, no, Pheebs, we can't, ok, because its like math, one plus one equals two. I can't stand by and let you think one plus one might equal three or four or yellow.
{Here is Ross's Rationalism. Notice now that Ross has conveniently made Evolution equal to logic and mathematics. Do I really need to expand on this to demonstrate how clearly false this argument is? All I will say is that math and logic are unchanging or static. What would Ross say produces these unchangeable facts? He would say the human brain, but how are they unchanging reliable truths if they are originated in a changing, dynamic brain? The cause must be greater than the effect and if the genesis for the laws of logic were produced by something that is in constant flux they too would be in constant flux. Ross's argument is self refuting (so is any other evolutionary argument)he is essentially saying that the ever changing evolution is an unchanging reality and yet all logic is within the changing human brain and yet retains its unchanging nature, very dogmatic and contradictory. Even Carl Sagan when he wrote Contact admits that math would be a universal language, and so would logic.}
PHOEBE: What is this obsessive need you have to make everyone agree with you? No, what's that all about? I think, I think maybe it's time you put Ross under the microscope.
{Again, why does Ross have to be such an oppressor? Yet more of Phoebe's Postmodernity.}
ROSS: Is there blood coming out of my ears?
LATER...
PHOEBE: Uh-oh. It's Scary Scientist Man.
ROSS: Ok, Phoebe, this is it. In this briefcase I carry actual scientific facts. A briefcase of facts, if you will. Some of these fossils are over 200 million years old.
PHOEBE: Ok, look, before you even start, I'm not denying evolution, ok, I'm just saying that it's one of the possibilities.
{There are many metanarratives why should one be greater by being true?}
ROSS: It's the only possibility, Phoebe.
PHOEBE: Ok, Ross, could you just open your mind like this much, ok? Wasn't there a time when the brightest minds in the world believed that the world was flat? And, up until like what, 50 years ago, you all thought the atom was the smallest thing, until you split it open, and this like, whole mess of crap came out. Now, are you telling me that you are so unbelievably arrogant that you can't admit that there's a teeny tiny possibility that you could be wrong about this?
{Scientists have made mistakes so they can't be trusted according to Phoebe. There is still progress yet to be made so science can not be trusted according to Phoebe. Lastly, Ross is morally flawed (arrogant) for believing his views to be true. Postmodernism}
ROSS: There might be, a teeny, tiny, possibility.
PHOEBE: I can't believe you caved.
ROSS: What?
PHOEBE: You just abandoned your whole belief system. I mean, before, I didn't agree with you, but at least I respected you. How, how, how are you going to go into work tomorrow? How, how are you going to face the other science guys? How, how are you going to face yourself? Oh! That was fun. So who's hungry?
{Ross loses due to the rhetorical leverage gained by Phoebe's attack on Ross's epistemology, which states that there are no doubts when there is overwhelming empirical data. Ross's rationalism failed for it could not be supported by the assumptions of Empiricism. Once Ross conceded doubt he did so on the grounds that the empirical data alone would not suffice and because he grouped the rationality of logic as part of evolution his Rationalism failed as well. Winner: Phoebe, who is actually a loser as well because she assumes that her position (that all views should be treated as equally plausible) is true and because no position can claim to be true then this would include her own making it false. So the real winner is: you if you do not embrace either of these false views, congratulations! You win a copy of 1984!}
God, Time, and Eternity X, Part 1
Well, now things really heat up as we explore the opposition to timeless eternity or what we will be calling the Temporalist's position. I am fascinated to know what their ideas are as I hope that you are as well so let's dive in.
TIMELESSNESS AND GOD AS A PERSON
What does it mean to be a person? Are there not some things that must be inherent in an individual in order to qualify one as a person? Certainly we would say that God is a person wouldn't we? If God is a person what are some of the important qualities required to possess personhood?
Feinberg quotes Richard Coburn whom I will paraphrase:
In order to be a person one should be able to do the following: remember, anticipate, reflect, deliberate, decide, intend, and act intentionally (if your thinking what I'm thinking this list in reference to God should be bothering you right about now. In reference to humans I am a bit uncomfortable with this list as well, there have been babies aborted whom would not possess some of these traits, are they not persons? Don't count him out yet, but this is not a good beginning and seems to reek of a bit of existentialism). If an eternal being lacked these qualities he could not be a person, if he did possess these qualities he must be in time.
Furthermore, a timeless being could not respond in writing or speech or stimuli. The being would be frozen or static as he would have no before or after. Some disagree with the notion that a timeless being is incapable of doing ALL of these things. How so? Let us say that God (given atemporal assumptions)intends to do something or has a purpose. Now, suppose you or I intend to go shopping this would be that we wish to go shopping (not necessarily that we intend in that we are making plans to go but incline to go shopping, or that we have the desire to go). To say that God intends all to be saved means he wishes all to be saved. One can be timeless and have such a wish. Another way in which the word intend can be used is to say one intends to accomplish something by doing something. One does not have to be temporal in this sense either. To do something in the belief that there will be some consequence, one would not have done said activity if one did not believe that certain results would be achieved. Although the activity to produce the results must be in time the agent causing the activity does not. This only holds water if a timeless being can act on the timeless at all (interesting!). All of this assumes that the timeless agent knows what time is in a world wrought with time and the Temporalist believes that this will be very difficult for the Atemporalist to maintain. Many Atemporalist say that this is all a moot point because God acts out of a perfect timeless state and makes events occur within time with precision, Feinberg seems to doubt that this will turn out to make sense though.
The next part of the argument will look at hog God interacts with time outside of time and how he responds to time laden events outside of time, should be interesting.
TIMELESSNESS AND GOD AS A PERSON
What does it mean to be a person? Are there not some things that must be inherent in an individual in order to qualify one as a person? Certainly we would say that God is a person wouldn't we? If God is a person what are some of the important qualities required to possess personhood?
Feinberg quotes Richard Coburn whom I will paraphrase:
In order to be a person one should be able to do the following: remember, anticipate, reflect, deliberate, decide, intend, and act intentionally (if your thinking what I'm thinking this list in reference to God should be bothering you right about now. In reference to humans I am a bit uncomfortable with this list as well, there have been babies aborted whom would not possess some of these traits, are they not persons? Don't count him out yet, but this is not a good beginning and seems to reek of a bit of existentialism). If an eternal being lacked these qualities he could not be a person, if he did possess these qualities he must be in time.
Furthermore, a timeless being could not respond in writing or speech or stimuli. The being would be frozen or static as he would have no before or after. Some disagree with the notion that a timeless being is incapable of doing ALL of these things. How so? Let us say that God (given atemporal assumptions)intends to do something or has a purpose. Now, suppose you or I intend to go shopping this would be that we wish to go shopping (not necessarily that we intend in that we are making plans to go but incline to go shopping, or that we have the desire to go). To say that God intends all to be saved means he wishes all to be saved. One can be timeless and have such a wish. Another way in which the word intend can be used is to say one intends to accomplish something by doing something. One does not have to be temporal in this sense either. To do something in the belief that there will be some consequence, one would not have done said activity if one did not believe that certain results would be achieved. Although the activity to produce the results must be in time the agent causing the activity does not. This only holds water if a timeless being can act on the timeless at all (interesting!). All of this assumes that the timeless agent knows what time is in a world wrought with time and the Temporalist believes that this will be very difficult for the Atemporalist to maintain. Many Atemporalist say that this is all a moot point because God acts out of a perfect timeless state and makes events occur within time with precision, Feinberg seems to doubt that this will turn out to make sense though.
The next part of the argument will look at hog God interacts with time outside of time and how he responds to time laden events outside of time, should be interesting.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Brain Teaser
Thomas Reid
The ideal system of David Hume is mainly under attack by Reid’s philosophy. He is replacing the concepts of the ideal system with principles of common sense. For Reid the mind works with inherent principles of conception and belief which is almost opposite of Hume’s concept. According to Reid the mind is fashioned to automatically believe when spurred on by sensations prompted by the external world. For example, smelling something causes belief that there is something to be smelled. The belief is not anecdotal or rational but is actually caused by the smell its self.
Sensations cannot be synonymous with external objects, therefore there is an epistemic chain from the object to belief through the median of sensation. The sensation cannot be confused with the object itself for they are not the same thing. This bifurcation allows one to have confidence in the existence of the external world, according to Reid. Intuition (I think the assumption of the law of identity) makes it plain to us that objects and senses are different, so this answers Hume who would say that sensations are merely representations or imprints.
John Frame
For Frame knowledge is tethered to the Lordship of God. This lordship makes God known and known to all. Those who would embrace agnosticism are self deceived and in some cases are proactively deceiving others. God is a Lord that works through covenants and his “covenantal presence” is found in all God has created. Frame concludes that this makes his presence epistemologically inescapable. All things are under God’s control, knowledge is a recognition of divine norms for truth which in turn is a recognition of God’s authority. Due to these conclusions Frame implies a question; if we know anything do we not also know God? For the believer this implies a knowledge of wrath as well as general knowledge of God.
-Are these positions compatible or opposed?
-Can there be a synthesis formed between the two?
-Is Reid's position less dogmatic than Frame's?
-How do these systems compare to your own understanding of knowledge?
Sunday, March 15, 2009
God, Time, and Eternity IX
Analogy of God as Spaceless
We have touched on God and analogy several times in Sunday School and I think that we are all pretty familiar with analogies so I don't think I need to go over this too much, but if this portion becomes confusing (which I can't imagine happening :) please post a question concerning analogies. God's relationship to space has often been considered by theologians analogously and so has God's relationship to time. Now, Feinberg considers some examinations on the subject from Schleiermacher who explains that God has a lack of spacial extension or he does not fill space with height, weight and so forth. A corollary position must then be considered; God has no contrasts within space. He is not above or below an object at a particular measurement. In the same vein as his relationship to space so also is his relationship to time, both temporal extension and temporal location. To be more clear, he lacks extension in time and location in time. The assumption of this proposition is that time and space are related in a similar manner so much so that what is true for the spacial proposition is true for the temporal proposition. Feinberg only offers a summery of a bigger argument. Essentially if God is proven to be timeless then he is spaceless, however those who oppose Atemporalism are attempting to prove that God is in time and therefore in space which is against traditional Christian doctrine.
This is an intriguing argument and I am disappointed that Feinberg didn't cover it in more detail. I will leave it up to you to determine the strength or weakness of this position. In my personal opinion it seems a bit flimsy. It may even come a bit close to violating the excluded middle which says that because two things are similar it does not follow that they are the same. I think that time and space are very closely linked (although I have friends who are persuading me to rethink this position) but for this argument to be effective it needs more assurance in this regard.
Temporal God Leads to Process Theism
This argument is used to demonstrate the consequences of adopting an alternative position. If God is temporal then he may not be immutable and if he is not immutable than he may not be impassible. He could experience reactionary emotions and suffer just like any human. If God is in time then he can not know all of time at once. One could say that God knows the future while in time, but this would be a strict determinism (I think Feinberg is a determinist of some kind and it should be interesting seeing how he deals with this because he does favor the atemporal position). Because Indeterminists hold to their position so strongly it has led some to deny that God has any foreknowledge at all. If the stakes are this high should not one be careful about adopting a position that would lead to heresy? Due to the fact that the other attributes of God are so clearly stated in scripture then this argument carries a lot of weight.
Next time we will begin Feinberg's session on arguments against timeless eternity. Some of these arguments are very long and may take several sessions just to cover one so your feedback could be helpful. I don't mind the arguments being difficult and wading through them but I don't want you to have to wade through formatting issues so keep me informed as to how I can help.
We have touched on God and analogy several times in Sunday School and I think that we are all pretty familiar with analogies so I don't think I need to go over this too much, but if this portion becomes confusing (which I can't imagine happening :) please post a question concerning analogies. God's relationship to space has often been considered by theologians analogously and so has God's relationship to time. Now, Feinberg considers some examinations on the subject from Schleiermacher who explains that God has a lack of spacial extension or he does not fill space with height, weight and so forth. A corollary position must then be considered; God has no contrasts within space. He is not above or below an object at a particular measurement. In the same vein as his relationship to space so also is his relationship to time, both temporal extension and temporal location. To be more clear, he lacks extension in time and location in time. The assumption of this proposition is that time and space are related in a similar manner so much so that what is true for the spacial proposition is true for the temporal proposition. Feinberg only offers a summery of a bigger argument. Essentially if God is proven to be timeless then he is spaceless, however those who oppose Atemporalism are attempting to prove that God is in time and therefore in space which is against traditional Christian doctrine.
This is an intriguing argument and I am disappointed that Feinberg didn't cover it in more detail. I will leave it up to you to determine the strength or weakness of this position. In my personal opinion it seems a bit flimsy. It may even come a bit close to violating the excluded middle which says that because two things are similar it does not follow that they are the same. I think that time and space are very closely linked (although I have friends who are persuading me to rethink this position) but for this argument to be effective it needs more assurance in this regard.
Temporal God Leads to Process Theism
This argument is used to demonstrate the consequences of adopting an alternative position. If God is temporal then he may not be immutable and if he is not immutable than he may not be impassible. He could experience reactionary emotions and suffer just like any human. If God is in time then he can not know all of time at once. One could say that God knows the future while in time, but this would be a strict determinism (I think Feinberg is a determinist of some kind and it should be interesting seeing how he deals with this because he does favor the atemporal position). Because Indeterminists hold to their position so strongly it has led some to deny that God has any foreknowledge at all. If the stakes are this high should not one be careful about adopting a position that would lead to heresy? Due to the fact that the other attributes of God are so clearly stated in scripture then this argument carries a lot of weight.
Next time we will begin Feinberg's session on arguments against timeless eternity. Some of these arguments are very long and may take several sessions just to cover one so your feedback could be helpful. I don't mind the arguments being difficult and wading through them but I don't want you to have to wade through formatting issues so keep me informed as to how I can help.
Friday, January 9, 2009
God, Time, and Eternity VIII
Well, Christmas and New Years are over so it's time to get back to the cerebral grindstone!
Temporal Duration Inadequate for the Ground of All Being
This is a fascinating argument. Two scholars that Feinberg quoted earlier are the main source of this argument which comes to us by way of implication. Temporal duration is only a momentary lapse of genuine duration according to the two scholars. The past has ceased to be and the future has yet to arrive so given the Temporalists position the current moment will be a very short span, or at the very least the status of any given moment is destined to change from the current moment to "the past". Temporal flux demonstrates that everything within time has no permanent status even if it appears to. How does time effect the status of being? How can something exist within a temporal framework and retain the status of immutable being? This seems to imply the need for some permanent actuality rather than a permamnent potentiality that the Temporalist seems to imply. God's being would have a potential future and past. A permanent actuality of being seems impossible if that being's status changes with time. If the being is not within time then this is not a problem.
The Temporalist present two counter arguments:
1) Temporal duration is real temporal duration and the Atemporalist argument makes the Temporalist position out to be a non-genuine temporality. If the object in question does not retain its identity from one moment to the next then there is no genuine duration. How is this? The object in question would have to go out of existence to pass to the next moment. With each passing moment the object would have to cease to exist or completely change. The Temporalist admits to change, but it does not have to be all or nothing. (I could be misunderstanding Feinberg here, but this seems like a disturbing admission, because God is immutable and actual so the degree of change seems irrelevant to me the question is, how could God change at all?)
2) Is permanence better than change? Would not a workable universe be served better by both? (Could God not supply the permanence and time supply the temporary?)
As interesting as this argument is it still only works by implication which is always thorny to deal with.
Temporal Duration Inadequate for the Ground of All Being
This is a fascinating argument. Two scholars that Feinberg quoted earlier are the main source of this argument which comes to us by way of implication. Temporal duration is only a momentary lapse of genuine duration according to the two scholars. The past has ceased to be and the future has yet to arrive so given the Temporalists position the current moment will be a very short span, or at the very least the status of any given moment is destined to change from the current moment to "the past". Temporal flux demonstrates that everything within time has no permanent status even if it appears to. How does time effect the status of being? How can something exist within a temporal framework and retain the status of immutable being? This seems to imply the need for some permanent actuality rather than a permamnent potentiality that the Temporalist seems to imply. God's being would have a potential future and past. A permanent actuality of being seems impossible if that being's status changes with time. If the being is not within time then this is not a problem.
The Temporalist present two counter arguments:
1) Temporal duration is real temporal duration and the Atemporalist argument makes the Temporalist position out to be a non-genuine temporality. If the object in question does not retain its identity from one moment to the next then there is no genuine duration. How is this? The object in question would have to go out of existence to pass to the next moment. With each passing moment the object would have to cease to exist or completely change. The Temporalist admits to change, but it does not have to be all or nothing. (I could be misunderstanding Feinberg here, but this seems like a disturbing admission, because God is immutable and actual so the degree of change seems irrelevant to me the question is, how could God change at all?)
2) Is permanence better than change? Would not a workable universe be served better by both? (Could God not supply the permanence and time supply the temporary?)
As interesting as this argument is it still only works by implication which is always thorny to deal with.
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