Thomas Reid
The ideal system of David Hume is mainly under attack by Reid’s philosophy. He is replacing the concepts of the ideal system with principles of common sense. For Reid the mind works with inherent principles of conception and belief which is almost opposite of Hume’s concept. According to Reid the mind is fashioned to automatically believe when spurred on by sensations prompted by the external world. For example, smelling something causes belief that there is something to be smelled. The belief is not anecdotal or rational but is actually caused by the smell its self.
Sensations cannot be synonymous with external objects, therefore there is an epistemic chain from the object to belief through the median of sensation. The sensation cannot be confused with the object itself for they are not the same thing. This bifurcation allows one to have confidence in the existence of the external world, according to Reid. Intuition (I think the assumption of the law of identity) makes it plain to us that objects and senses are different, so this answers Hume who would say that sensations are merely representations or imprints.
John Frame
For Frame knowledge is tethered to the Lordship of God. This lordship makes God known and known to all. Those who would embrace agnosticism are self deceived and in some cases are proactively deceiving others. God is a Lord that works through covenants and his “covenantal presence” is found in all God has created. Frame concludes that this makes his presence epistemologically inescapable. All things are under God’s control, knowledge is a recognition of divine norms for truth which in turn is a recognition of God’s authority. Due to these conclusions Frame implies a question; if we know anything do we not also know God? For the believer this implies a knowledge of wrath as well as general knowledge of God.
-Are these positions compatible or opposed?
-Can there be a synthesis formed between the two?
-Is Reid's position less dogmatic than Frame's?
-How do these systems compare to your own understanding of knowledge?
2 comments:
Travis,
As I understand Frame, he seems to be basing his position on Romans 1:20. If that is true, then by simply utilizing the natural faculties of human beings, we are able to clearly perceive God’s invisible attributes because those attributes are revealed to us in Creation. I’m comfortable with combining covenantal and universal language here because we would be dealing with the Creation covenant – therefore all mankind would be involved in this.
Reid seems to be talking about clearly perceiving things as well, and thereby formulating justified true beliefs about those things. In other words, Reid’s Scottish Common Sense Realism effectively defeats Hume’s skepticism. We can and do, all the time, formulate justified true beliefs that are tethered to reality. The epistemological chain there includes sense perception by natural human faculties.
If I understand these two positions then I would say they are not opposed to one another but are actually quite complimentary. Here, I would prefer to utilize Paul’s position in Romans 1:20 by pointing out that if Creation accurately, despite the Fall, reveals God’s invisible attributes to humanity such that we are without excuse, then humanity must be able to reliably perceive Creation so that the revelation is accurately conveyed to us. If it were not, we WOULD have an excuse.
As for a synthesis between the two positions: Reid’s position argues cogently that humanity can form right beliefs about reality. Frame’s position simply takes that a step farther and points out that the right beliefs about reality also constitute right knowledge about God (as partial as it may be).
I’m not sure what you mean about the dogmatism present in the two positions. Both positions are theological.
As far as my own understanding of knowledge goes, I think a good starting place for epistemology is that justified true beliefs that are tethered to reality constitute knowledge. I know there are detractors from this position, but I think this is at least a helpful place to start. One thing I will say, the standard postmodern position about knowledge is troubling. It seems that when someone claims to know something, they are immediately branded as arrogant and accused of claiming to have omniscient knowledge of something. The argument goes that if you don’t know something completely (omnisciently) then you can’t possibly claim to actually know something. To do so would be the height of arrogance. This position on knowledge is simply the old skepticism dressed up wearing cool glasses and sipping Starbucks Coffee. Reid is quite helpful here and coupled with Frame’s position lays out a humble, yet truthful, claim to knowledge. We can know truth even if the omniscient position belongs to God alone.
Jason
Good post Jason. Especially your last paragraph, really good.
Concerning dogmatism, I wasn't real clear about this. I agree with you that a synthesis is available between these positions and should make a good argument. However, I doubt Frame would appreciate it. I failed to mention that he feels his position is adequate (as an apologetic) by its self. Reid had some pretty messed up theology himself. It also seems like he embraced the Aristotelian position that the objects them selves were adequate for knowledge and needed nothing else nor hinted at anything else beyond our daily experience (in regard to the physical alone). If I'm accurate here (to be honest I'm not entirely sure, there could be things I'm missing) then Reid's position could be seen as lacking in theological consequence.
The way I should have worded the dogma issue is probably better stated this way:
"Many find Frame's position dogmatic, on the surface Reid's position looks less dogmatic, but is that really so?"
I would say no, if it claims to be pan-epistemic. How do we explain the law of identity in simple physical terms? We can't, and yet we need it. Reid fails to ultimately deliver from a dogmatism in his own system. I think Reid helps the case for Foundationalist Epistemology where the physical is considered properly basic, but without God one can not sustain the law of identity, so even the Foundationalist is at an impasse (unless said foundationalist is a Theist).
I think you would find it interesting that at the end of Reid's book were some correspondence by proxy between Hume and Reid and Hume was impressed with Reid's argument and offered little retort. Haha, take that Hume, nobody likes you!
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