I read an article in the Courier Journal about a high school project where all of these students were making individual videos to support religious tolerance. Each student was from a different faith. A thought occurred to me that is not new, but the article rekindled a passion that escapes my senses. This happens because lies are so often thrown at us in this culture that we often become desensitized. First, what does it mean to be tolerant? I don't ever hear about Buddhists and Christians at each other's throats in back alley knife fights. When was the last time you heard of a Hindu gunned down in a drive by by a group of Hasidic Jews? If we all lived in the ivory towers that our media resides in one would think there are Christians hiding in nativity scenes with Tech 9s and Glocks waiting for unsuspecting Mormons to come by and gun them down after they are made to eat their own name tags.
Do you think in a million years the media would have reported a film festival where the videos were pleading with radical Muslims to show tolerance? Do you think our liberal educated high school teachers would ever have allowed a festival such as that? I doubt it. How about a truly educational film where good hermeneutical principles are applied to the Koran that shows that the radical Muslim may be more in line with the Koran than their counter parts? We all know they wouldn't. First, it would highlight who is really being tolerant and who isn't. Secondly, it would demonstrate that religions are largely tolerant and this political correctness (new speak as its called in 1984) has tried to change the meaning of tolerance. Lastly, it would show that not all religions are morally equal, some are evil. If this last statement bothers you, watch out, you may have been lured into the lie. All religions are not the same and yet they can be tolerant while respectfully disagreeing. They don't all lead to the same place, but we can have a conversation. It's the ones who are truly violent that are the intolerant.
Monday, December 22, 2008
God, Time, and Eternity VII
Timelessness and Divine Freedom
I had a pretty funny conversation with a friend of mine after work one night. We were sitting in the parking lot listening to music in his car and I was getting ready to get out and get into my own vehicle when we started an interesting theological conversation. He unwaveringly stated, "We have free will, it is an absolute fact." and I asked him if he believed that God knows all things. He said yes. I said, "So when I get out of your car and get into mine, God knows when that will happen and how?" He said yes. I then asked if those events had to take place the way God knows they will happen, and he was as certain about that as he was about free will. I then asked, "If these future events must unfold in the way God knows they will, then how do I have the freedom to choose otherwise?" He looked forward out the window for a second or two and said, "Yeah, I guess we may not have free will." That was the quickest second guessing to a conviction I have ever experienced. I have to say that it may be to his credit that he was willing to think about the issue honestly and be open to other possibilities, not that that is always a good thing, but in this case it was.
While we see that this problem arises very easily for humanity, it may escape our immediate thoughts that this problem could apply to God. For if God is within time then he must do what he foreknows. God knows what he is going to do and those events must take place the way he foreknows them to take place.
For the Atemporalist God does not have to foreknow because foreknowledge implies a sequential order of moments. The one who will feel the impact of this argument the most is a Temporalist who holds to libertarian free will. The response from this position may be that God's knowledge does not cause what he does and because he is going to do what he wants to do anyway, it then seems that this argument is fairly ineffective. It seems that each position has a good response to this dilemma.
I had a pretty funny conversation with a friend of mine after work one night. We were sitting in the parking lot listening to music in his car and I was getting ready to get out and get into my own vehicle when we started an interesting theological conversation. He unwaveringly stated, "We have free will, it is an absolute fact." and I asked him if he believed that God knows all things. He said yes. I said, "So when I get out of your car and get into mine, God knows when that will happen and how?" He said yes. I then asked if those events had to take place the way God knows they will happen, and he was as certain about that as he was about free will. I then asked, "If these future events must unfold in the way God knows they will, then how do I have the freedom to choose otherwise?" He looked forward out the window for a second or two and said, "Yeah, I guess we may not have free will." That was the quickest second guessing to a conviction I have ever experienced. I have to say that it may be to his credit that he was willing to think about the issue honestly and be open to other possibilities, not that that is always a good thing, but in this case it was.
While we see that this problem arises very easily for humanity, it may escape our immediate thoughts that this problem could apply to God. For if God is within time then he must do what he foreknows. God knows what he is going to do and those events must take place the way he foreknows them to take place.
For the Atemporalist God does not have to foreknow because foreknowledge implies a sequential order of moments. The one who will feel the impact of this argument the most is a Temporalist who holds to libertarian free will. The response from this position may be that God's knowledge does not cause what he does and because he is going to do what he wants to do anyway, it then seems that this argument is fairly ineffective. It seems that each position has a good response to this dilemma.
Friday, December 19, 2008
God, Time, and Eternity VI
Creation and a Sempiternal God
If God is sempiternal or exists in a sequential time of his own, what was he doing before he created the universe? God would have existed in an infinite amount of time and at some point decided to create the universe. Given that the act of creating the universe was good, according to Genesis, what was his reason for delay? What was he doing before he created the universe? What prompted him to do it? Feinberg accepts the notion that this critique is without adequate response from the Temporalist. This is a good lesson in referencing the footnotes, because there is a fascinating response mentioned. According to the footnote the Temporalist must retreat to a position that sees the created order and God equally basic metaphysically. The world would then be limited to agreeing with God's aims. Creation ex nihilo would be ruled out. What is fascinating about this is that it would remove the sempiternal position that God has a separate time frame (as far as I can tell) and Kalam becomes a problem all over again. Even if it didn't remove God's partitioned time frame (which I seriously doubt it would) we would still have to deal with Kalam as it applies to the world. I think the sempiternalist gains no ground trying to explain answer this critique in this way.
A famous quote from Augustin's time comes from this question from his contemporary skeptics. When asked what God was doing before he created the world some would respond, "preparing Hell for people who ask such questions." Augustine saw this as missing the point and put forward his apologetic about God's relationship to time. To ask what God was doing before he created the world posits a time frame God must act with in. There was no before or after concerning God's activities.
The Atemporalist position asserts that God wills timelessly no matter what the act including the creation of time its self , therefore God could not be said to have delayed in any action including creation.
The next section is very important and I am limited on time now, so I will post the next point in part VII possibly over the weekend of 12/20.
If God is sempiternal or exists in a sequential time of his own, what was he doing before he created the universe? God would have existed in an infinite amount of time and at some point decided to create the universe. Given that the act of creating the universe was good, according to Genesis, what was his reason for delay? What was he doing before he created the universe? What prompted him to do it? Feinberg accepts the notion that this critique is without adequate response from the Temporalist. This is a good lesson in referencing the footnotes, because there is a fascinating response mentioned. According to the footnote the Temporalist must retreat to a position that sees the created order and God equally basic metaphysically. The world would then be limited to agreeing with God's aims. Creation ex nihilo would be ruled out. What is fascinating about this is that it would remove the sempiternal position that God has a separate time frame (as far as I can tell) and Kalam becomes a problem all over again. Even if it didn't remove God's partitioned time frame (which I seriously doubt it would) we would still have to deal with Kalam as it applies to the world. I think the sempiternalist gains no ground trying to explain answer this critique in this way.
A famous quote from Augustin's time comes from this question from his contemporary skeptics. When asked what God was doing before he created the world some would respond, "preparing Hell for people who ask such questions." Augustine saw this as missing the point and put forward his apologetic about God's relationship to time. To ask what God was doing before he created the world posits a time frame God must act with in. There was no before or after concerning God's activities.
The Atemporalist position asserts that God wills timelessly no matter what the act including the creation of time its self , therefore God could not be said to have delayed in any action including creation.
The next section is very important and I am limited on time now, so I will post the next point in part VII possibly over the weekend of 12/20.
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
Christianity and Philososphy reviewing "Critique of Pure Reason" by Immanuel Kant
FYI: We are not abandoning God and Time I am trying to juggle several issues at once when time permits.
Why should a Christian concern him or herself with philosophy? I like the way Francis Schaeffer approaches this issue. He sees it as a mission to engage philosophy. C.S. Lewis felt that it was a worthy endeavor simply because bad philosophy should be challenged. I personally find that it keeps us in contact or in the conversation of current events. Often times it requires philosophical jargon go express theological realities. It is probably true that Christians reject philosophy because there is an intimidation factor or that it requires work (neither is an acceptable excuse considering the fact that the gospel is under philosophical attack almost constantly).
Sometimes when one studies philosophy one gets so caught up in a series of arguments that it is difficult to remember why one began to study a particular issue to begin with. This happens in theology as well. I recall in the book of Judges the Jews had to recall a border dispute to show their enemies why they had a righteous claim on certain land rights. If we never had to go the long way to do something godly we would have to scrap church business meetings all together. Sometimes the long road yields fruit that the shortest path could not have produced, i.e. 40 years in the wilderness.
No one tests the bounds of philosophical futility more than Immanuel Kant. He never crosses the line in my opinion, but he does come close. With Kant, one can find oneself thinking about a universe with just one hand in it to determine if there is inherent meaning in the physical makeup of the cosmos. If it were not for the enormity of the issue he was exploring and its implications it would be sinful to waste time chasing after such thoughts. Kant was a very crafty thinker and his thoughts had ramifications that still effect us today. I think it would almost be a sin not to explore some of the thoughts of these great thinkers, especially since they are likely the genesis of thoughts that have lead people astray from the truths of scripture for many years. The ironic think with Kant is that he was actually trying to defend Christianity, but some of the ideas he bought into had a catastrophic effect on the cerebral landscape of his time and beyond.
It will be work to critique Critique of Pure Reason but the fruits of this study will be worthy of our calling as Christians.
For someone who is new in philosophy, asking them to understand Kant first is sort of like asking a kid at his first swimming lesson to dive into the deep end of the pool without a life preserver. I will do my best to make this plain and clear but you may have to read this several times and post questions. Your efforts will be rewarded.
Why should a Christian concern him or herself with philosophy? I like the way Francis Schaeffer approaches this issue. He sees it as a mission to engage philosophy. C.S. Lewis felt that it was a worthy endeavor simply because bad philosophy should be challenged. I personally find that it keeps us in contact or in the conversation of current events. Often times it requires philosophical jargon go express theological realities. It is probably true that Christians reject philosophy because there is an intimidation factor or that it requires work (neither is an acceptable excuse considering the fact that the gospel is under philosophical attack almost constantly).
Sometimes when one studies philosophy one gets so caught up in a series of arguments that it is difficult to remember why one began to study a particular issue to begin with. This happens in theology as well. I recall in the book of Judges the Jews had to recall a border dispute to show their enemies why they had a righteous claim on certain land rights. If we never had to go the long way to do something godly we would have to scrap church business meetings all together. Sometimes the long road yields fruit that the shortest path could not have produced, i.e. 40 years in the wilderness.
No one tests the bounds of philosophical futility more than Immanuel Kant. He never crosses the line in my opinion, but he does come close. With Kant, one can find oneself thinking about a universe with just one hand in it to determine if there is inherent meaning in the physical makeup of the cosmos. If it were not for the enormity of the issue he was exploring and its implications it would be sinful to waste time chasing after such thoughts. Kant was a very crafty thinker and his thoughts had ramifications that still effect us today. I think it would almost be a sin not to explore some of the thoughts of these great thinkers, especially since they are likely the genesis of thoughts that have lead people astray from the truths of scripture for many years. The ironic think with Kant is that he was actually trying to defend Christianity, but some of the ideas he bought into had a catastrophic effect on the cerebral landscape of his time and beyond.
It will be work to critique Critique of Pure Reason but the fruits of this study will be worthy of our calling as Christians.
For someone who is new in philosophy, asking them to understand Kant first is sort of like asking a kid at his first swimming lesson to dive into the deep end of the pool without a life preserver. I will do my best to make this plain and clear but you may have to read this several times and post questions. Your efforts will be rewarded.
Critique of Pure Reason
Preface
Preface
What is cognition? It is the act or process of knowing something. Kant starts his preface with a pretty bold postulate, "There can be little doubt that all our cognition begins with experience." In the field of epistemology (how we know things) this is a statement that yields a dichotomy: first, Kant is making a statement about how much the world outside of our own minds effects what we know and how much the outside world imposes itself on our noetic equipment (our minds). This is classically known as externalism. Externalists believe that the outside world has a great effect on what we know. The opposite of externalism is internalism, which states that our noetic equipment is not effected by anything other than its self.There is a whole world of moderate positions between the two which I believe Kant falls into; we will revisit this issue again. The second part of the dichotomy is called Foundationalism. Foundationalists believe that our knowledge rests on foundations which are usually external to ourselves. What would qualify as a foundational belief to build ones epistemology upon? I believe the laws of logic qualify. Usually Foundationalists base their epistemology on external perceivable realities. No doubt, we will visit this again later.
Kant questions how one's cognitive abilities can be stirred into action without outside forces effecting our senses. I want to take a moment and mention that this could go down a very troubling avenue. If outside forces stir us into our cognitive processes it is going to be hard to escape some form of determinism. I'm not sure whether Kant is concerning himself with this at all, it could be one of his main points for all I know. We really need to stop and consider the consequences of this statement. If physical forces outside of my mind determine my thoughts, then I really have very little control over my own thoughts and what I believe. This is a big issue in philosophy known as doxastic voluntarism; how much control do I have over my own beliefs? Don't I have a duty to believe what is most rational within the knowledge I posses? This question sums up what is known as epistemic duties. If forces outside of my mind cause me to believe what I believe then my epistemic duties go no further than what I believe. A doxastic determinism caused my beliefs and my epistemic duties are to believe what ever it is that I believe because I had absolutely no control over what I believe. I suspect we will visit this again as well.
The word "stir" is a bit ambiguous, but Kant emphasizes experience so much that it seems likely "stir" means "cause" rather than "influence" or "nudge".
Kant feels that the objects of the world do two things. First, they bring about presentations. The word "presentations" would seem to imply that our senses may be imperfect and so the objects can only be manifested as presentations rather that univocal (exactly the same) copies in our minds of what is actually in the world (this is an educated guess). Secondly, they begin a process in our minds. This process is an effort to understand by comparing these presentations and either make connections or clear divisions. An example of a connection would be making historical connections such as the Treaty of Versailles to World War II; an example of a division might be the difference between a rock and a ball or how the Civil War was different from the Vietnam War. These collective impressions are called experiences. According to Kant we must have experiences in order to have cognitions, therefore experiences precede cognitions. So far this is Externalism; forces outside of our minds are critical to how and what we think.
Kant stresses that all cognition begins with experience, but if we think that all cognition is a result of experience then we are being too hasty. What does he mean? He is saying that while the initiative of thought may be experience the preceding thoughts are the result of the thoughts before them. So the way this may play out is one has an experience which causes a thought which causes a thought. The direct agent for one thought is not always experience but the ultimate cause is experience. Now, Kant has not avoided doxastic determinism because experience would still set noetic events in motion. When we have experiences it is possible that our minds supply thoughts into those impressions and distinctions between the two can become foggy. The way this can be conceived is to imagine that our minds have a data base of information stored in them. When we have an experience it sets our minds in motion and we add to those thoughts other thoughts from our data base, and how one distinguishes between the two can be murky. These stored thoughts are still subject to externalism for they arrived by experiences as well and then were stored.
If there is a cognition separate from experience (this would be internalism), according to Kant, it is not easy to determine and he admits ignorance on this issue. If there are cognitions separate from experience that are unprompted they are called a priori cognitions. Cognitions based in experience are called posteriori cognitions.
A priori cognitions are an ambiguous area for Kant and because of this the full meaning of the question of whether they exist at all is yet to be determined. Kant acknowledges that there are universal laws of logic; he insists that we come to these through experience. So, we have experiences and we may add to those experiences with a priori cognition, which is available to us through universal laws of logic which we also gained (Kant actually says "borrowed") through experience. Kant offers an illustration: "if someone has undermined the foundation of his house, we say that he would have known a priori that the house could cave in, i.e., he did not have to wait for the experience of its actually caving in. And yet he could not have known this completely a priori. For he did first have to find out through experience that bodies have weight and hence fall when their support is withdrawn."
Kant stresses that when he is referring to a priori he is not indicating that which is independent of certain experiences, but rather absolutely independent of all experience. If there are a priori cognitions that are completely independent from all experiences then they are to be considered pure. Kant grants an example that the notion "every change has its cause" is an a priori proposition, but it may not be considered pure because the entire concept of change only comes about through experience.
Let's summarize:
1) Cognition arrives through experience
2) Not all cognition arrives through experience
3) Some cognition arrives through previously stored cognition and interacts with cognition that is sparked by experience
4) If there is cognition that is separate from experience then it is called a priori
5) there are laws of logic
6) even a priori cognition that borrows from the laws of logic is rooted in experience
7) therefore, there is no pure a priori cognition
It is important to keep in mind that while Kant was a Theist he has done a great disservice to Theism by inviting the notion that the only mind that matters is the mind of man. We can not maintain that God received knowledge through experience. Given our current discussion of God and time, the Atemporalist has a good argument that shows that notions like a priori knowledge could never apply to God for he is not subject to time to begin with. Can not this God give man pure a priori knowledge? I say yes, if God so chooses thus.
Proverbs 8:22-27 (wisdom says) "The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his work the first of his acts of old. Ages ago I was set up at the first, before the beginning of the earth. When there were no depths I was brought forth, when there were no springs abounding with water. Before the mountains had been shaped, before the hills, I was brought forth, before he had made the earth with its fields, or the first of the dust of the world. When he established the heavens, I was there."
Before there were any things for one to experience wisdom was there. This passage is also speaking of Jesus, but the point for our look at Kant is that there is a mind that matters beyond man's. Notice that Kant expected us to understand his propositions regardless of whether the question of pure reason could be answered. This implies that there are things all people should know, because there is a law of logic that sets the parameters for what is knowable in the first place. So, we have a diversity of people with a diversity of experiences which all know the exact same thing, namely, the laws of logic. Kant admitted to a universal law of logic, how did that get there? This law does not change regardless of man's experiences. C.S. Lewis did this subject well for he establishes that miracles can occur if the uniformity of cause and effect can be shown to be violated. The laws of logic do just this because there is no cause within the universe for them and yet we use them all the time. We can avoid the problem of doxastic determinism because the laws of logic violates cause and effect. What is fascinating is that we can't even approach the laws of logic with questions like, "what causes them?" because they are static so nothing dynamic can cause them. The human brain (not to be confused with "mind") is dynamic, all material things are dynamic. The real question is "what sustains them?" Only an immutable mind can sustain them that is not subject to the dynamic principles of the universe and yet interacts with it. Romans 1 would seem to imply that God has embedded certain knowledge about particular things concerning himself that does not require experience, but rather is "built into" our cognitive abilities a priori. Although, these passages could assume that man is having the experiences he needs to possess knowledge off God, but I think this would assume Kant's assumption that man's brain and mind are the same thing (this gets into mind/body dualism which is an entirely different treatment which we will look at later and I will tie into these issues). This, along with Proverbs 8, seems to imply that there is such a thing as pure, a priori cognition. I am not saying that Kant is completely wrong but I am skeptical toward his position. How is Kant not completely wrong? Because man is limited and while we do have varying degrees of experience we still experience the laws of logic. What is important to remember is that these laws of logic exist whether humanity experiences them or not.
Kant questions how one's cognitive abilities can be stirred into action without outside forces effecting our senses. I want to take a moment and mention that this could go down a very troubling avenue. If outside forces stir us into our cognitive processes it is going to be hard to escape some form of determinism. I'm not sure whether Kant is concerning himself with this at all, it could be one of his main points for all I know. We really need to stop and consider the consequences of this statement. If physical forces outside of my mind determine my thoughts, then I really have very little control over my own thoughts and what I believe. This is a big issue in philosophy known as doxastic voluntarism; how much control do I have over my own beliefs? Don't I have a duty to believe what is most rational within the knowledge I posses? This question sums up what is known as epistemic duties. If forces outside of my mind cause me to believe what I believe then my epistemic duties go no further than what I believe. A doxastic determinism caused my beliefs and my epistemic duties are to believe what ever it is that I believe because I had absolutely no control over what I believe. I suspect we will visit this again as well.
The word "stir" is a bit ambiguous, but Kant emphasizes experience so much that it seems likely "stir" means "cause" rather than "influence" or "nudge".
Kant feels that the objects of the world do two things. First, they bring about presentations. The word "presentations" would seem to imply that our senses may be imperfect and so the objects can only be manifested as presentations rather that univocal (exactly the same) copies in our minds of what is actually in the world (this is an educated guess). Secondly, they begin a process in our minds. This process is an effort to understand by comparing these presentations and either make connections or clear divisions. An example of a connection would be making historical connections such as the Treaty of Versailles to World War II; an example of a division might be the difference between a rock and a ball or how the Civil War was different from the Vietnam War. These collective impressions are called experiences. According to Kant we must have experiences in order to have cognitions, therefore experiences precede cognitions. So far this is Externalism; forces outside of our minds are critical to how and what we think.
Kant stresses that all cognition begins with experience, but if we think that all cognition is a result of experience then we are being too hasty. What does he mean? He is saying that while the initiative of thought may be experience the preceding thoughts are the result of the thoughts before them. So the way this may play out is one has an experience which causes a thought which causes a thought. The direct agent for one thought is not always experience but the ultimate cause is experience. Now, Kant has not avoided doxastic determinism because experience would still set noetic events in motion. When we have experiences it is possible that our minds supply thoughts into those impressions and distinctions between the two can become foggy. The way this can be conceived is to imagine that our minds have a data base of information stored in them. When we have an experience it sets our minds in motion and we add to those thoughts other thoughts from our data base, and how one distinguishes between the two can be murky. These stored thoughts are still subject to externalism for they arrived by experiences as well and then were stored.
If there is a cognition separate from experience (this would be internalism), according to Kant, it is not easy to determine and he admits ignorance on this issue. If there are cognitions separate from experience that are unprompted they are called a priori cognitions. Cognitions based in experience are called posteriori cognitions.
A priori cognitions are an ambiguous area for Kant and because of this the full meaning of the question of whether they exist at all is yet to be determined. Kant acknowledges that there are universal laws of logic; he insists that we come to these through experience. So, we have experiences and we may add to those experiences with a priori cognition, which is available to us through universal laws of logic which we also gained (Kant actually says "borrowed") through experience. Kant offers an illustration: "if someone has undermined the foundation of his house, we say that he would have known a priori that the house could cave in, i.e., he did not have to wait for the experience of its actually caving in. And yet he could not have known this completely a priori. For he did first have to find out through experience that bodies have weight and hence fall when their support is withdrawn."
Kant stresses that when he is referring to a priori he is not indicating that which is independent of certain experiences, but rather absolutely independent of all experience. If there are a priori cognitions that are completely independent from all experiences then they are to be considered pure. Kant grants an example that the notion "every change has its cause" is an a priori proposition, but it may not be considered pure because the entire concept of change only comes about through experience.
Let's summarize:
1) Cognition arrives through experience
2) Not all cognition arrives through experience
3) Some cognition arrives through previously stored cognition and interacts with cognition that is sparked by experience
4) If there is cognition that is separate from experience then it is called a priori
5) there are laws of logic
6) even a priori cognition that borrows from the laws of logic is rooted in experience
7) therefore, there is no pure a priori cognition
It is important to keep in mind that while Kant was a Theist he has done a great disservice to Theism by inviting the notion that the only mind that matters is the mind of man. We can not maintain that God received knowledge through experience. Given our current discussion of God and time, the Atemporalist has a good argument that shows that notions like a priori knowledge could never apply to God for he is not subject to time to begin with. Can not this God give man pure a priori knowledge? I say yes, if God so chooses thus.
Proverbs 8:22-27 (wisdom says) "The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his work the first of his acts of old. Ages ago I was set up at the first, before the beginning of the earth. When there were no depths I was brought forth, when there were no springs abounding with water. Before the mountains had been shaped, before the hills, I was brought forth, before he had made the earth with its fields, or the first of the dust of the world. When he established the heavens, I was there."
Before there were any things for one to experience wisdom was there. This passage is also speaking of Jesus, but the point for our look at Kant is that there is a mind that matters beyond man's. Notice that Kant expected us to understand his propositions regardless of whether the question of pure reason could be answered. This implies that there are things all people should know, because there is a law of logic that sets the parameters for what is knowable in the first place. So, we have a diversity of people with a diversity of experiences which all know the exact same thing, namely, the laws of logic. Kant admitted to a universal law of logic, how did that get there? This law does not change regardless of man's experiences. C.S. Lewis did this subject well for he establishes that miracles can occur if the uniformity of cause and effect can be shown to be violated. The laws of logic do just this because there is no cause within the universe for them and yet we use them all the time. We can avoid the problem of doxastic determinism because the laws of logic violates cause and effect. What is fascinating is that we can't even approach the laws of logic with questions like, "what causes them?" because they are static so nothing dynamic can cause them. The human brain (not to be confused with "mind") is dynamic, all material things are dynamic. The real question is "what sustains them?" Only an immutable mind can sustain them that is not subject to the dynamic principles of the universe and yet interacts with it. Romans 1 would seem to imply that God has embedded certain knowledge about particular things concerning himself that does not require experience, but rather is "built into" our cognitive abilities a priori. Although, these passages could assume that man is having the experiences he needs to possess knowledge off God, but I think this would assume Kant's assumption that man's brain and mind are the same thing (this gets into mind/body dualism which is an entirely different treatment which we will look at later and I will tie into these issues). This, along with Proverbs 8, seems to imply that there is such a thing as pure, a priori cognition. I am not saying that Kant is completely wrong but I am skeptical toward his position. How is Kant not completely wrong? Because man is limited and while we do have varying degrees of experience we still experience the laws of logic. What is important to remember is that these laws of logic exist whether humanity experiences them or not.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
God, Time, and Eternity Part V
Infinity and God as Everlasting
This argument is based on the Kalam Cosmological argument. What is Kalam? In its bear essence: the universe is not eternal and therefore must have had a cause (Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, pg. 399). This reasserts questions from my previous post concerning the Atheistic pseudo argument, "Who created God?" Let us explore the force and effect of Kalam before we move on to the atemporal argument proper. There can not be an actual infinite. Infinity by definition means "never ending", so how could it possibly be actualized? To be actual would require it to end and thus rendering it less than never ending. Infinites by definition are potential. A good example would be that there is a potential infinite between the numbers 1 and 2: 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.111, etc. Remember that time moves in successive moments. A picture of you starring at the sun would have been an example of one of those moments. Could there be an actual infinite number of moments before this one? Kalam suggests not. One could never arrive at this moment, for an infinite number of moments would have to pass first. In order for an infinite number of moments to pass prior to this one, infinite moments would have to be actualized thus rendering them finite. Evidence for the truth of this abstract argument can be found in the Second Law of Thermodynamics. According to this law, everything in the universe is moving towards equilibrium or entropy. This is why if one pours cold water into a tub then hot water, they don't collect in respective partitions. Rather, they equalize and form a synthesis. Anther example would be that smoke in a bottle does not collect in one side or another, it distributes evenly. This law is a governing force of the universe writ large and so the entire cosmos is experiencing heat death. The entire universe is moving into a state of equilibrium. If the universe consisted of an infinite number of past events, then why has this not happened yet? One can not say there has not been enough time, there has been an infinite amount of time! This demonstrates the finite beginning of the universe, which implies that it was created, which implies a creator. This element of Kalam not withstanding, there is yet another aspect. Each successive moment of time must be infinite in and of itself if an actual infinite could exist. How then could a moment pass? If the universe is finite then it had a beginning; if it had a beginning then one would have to cause its beginning. So the Atheist asks, "What caused the one who caused the beginning?" This question implies an actual infinite regress which would mean we could never have arrived at this moment. But we have arrived at this moment. Therefor, something has to be necessary in and of itself and it either the universe (according to Bertrand Russell) or its a God. But how could the universe actualize its self? We all see that the universe moves in a uniformity of cause and effect and that nothing can cause its self. It seems far more rational to imply that a creator God would then be a necessary being. This God would create an order of cause and effect while not subjecting himself to it for he is the necessary cause and the universe is utterly contingent. This really puts a damper on straw man arguments from Freud and Marx who claim that religion is a result of some form of personal or psychological deficiency (not to mention the genetic fallacy). It is rational to believe there is a God when the universe keeps shoving it in your face!
How does this relate to the atemporal position? If God exists in time then this would imply an actual infinite, which Kalam demonstrates does not exist. This moment could never have arrived if there is an infinite number of preceding moments. However, this moment has arrived. Therefore, there has not been an infinite number of preceding events. This implies that there was a time in which God began to exist. This is impossible given that he is a necessary being (if this seems unsubstantiated please read previous post, if that does not convince you please read 1984), therefore he must exist timelessly.
Feinberg discusses two objections presented by those who advocate God as time laden. Temporalists argue that, "'there cannot ever be a realization of an additive, infinite succession which has a beginning (emphasis original). But God's existence from all eternity past is not the sort of series or succession which has a beginning'". The Temporalist's God has no beginning so they feel this derivative of Kalam has no force. This defense, as it turns out, is docile. Simply because a time laden God requires no beginning it does not answer the question of how we have arrived at this moment. Temporalists are still postulating an actual infinite regardless of the denial of an additive beginning.
One argument is never enough though. The Temporalists offer a second argument which postulates that God's existence before creation was undifferentiated. What does this mean? There is a difference between stating that infinite time existed before creation and saying that an infinite series of events existed before creation. I find this to be unhelpful. Essentially, the Temporalist is saying that God existed in an uneventful, nonpartitional (or no individual moments that move in successive order), homogenized "God-time". Feinberg elicits the help of a scholar named Paul Helm who is very skeptical toward the the Temporalist's position. Helm rejects the notion that there would be a undifferentiated "God-time" prior to the existence of the world. Temporalists feel that a timeless God would be lifeless, but Helm argues that a God without events would be lifeless as well. Helm explains that the implications of "God-time" is that there would be a successive mental life or a succession of thoughts in the divine mind. Time would then be far from undifferentiated but instead be marked by a series of mental events. If God does not exist in a timeless eternity then his thought life would imply a series of events. Any series of events would be infinite and thus imply an actual infinite which Kalam demonstrates can not be.
Feinberg makes an interesting observation. If God had no beginning, has no ending, endures infinitely, though atemporal, the same problem appears to confront the Atemporalist, namely, God's atemporal infinite existence is itself an actual infinite. If God is atemporal the infinite is not a derivative of a tally of infinite moments of God's life, but it is still atemporal duration, and due to the fact that God actually exists, this seems to imply that the problem of an actual infinite is not resolved by the Atemporalist.
A summery of the big picture is offered. We can easily demonstrate that the universe has no hope of autonomy from God as exhibited by Kalam. But our own understanding of God's relationship with time is in jeopardy (jeopardy is probably too strong of a word considering that one should not expect exhaustive knowledge of God in the first place). The idea of God being temporal or of existing in some sort of "God-time" is in trouble due to Kalam. However, the Atemporal position has not provided a sufficient defense once confronted with Kalam as well. Until the Atemporalist offers a non-question-begging response to Kalam themselves both positions have a problem.
This argument is based on the Kalam Cosmological argument. What is Kalam? In its bear essence: the universe is not eternal and therefore must have had a cause (Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, pg. 399). This reasserts questions from my previous post concerning the Atheistic pseudo argument, "Who created God?" Let us explore the force and effect of Kalam before we move on to the atemporal argument proper. There can not be an actual infinite. Infinity by definition means "never ending", so how could it possibly be actualized? To be actual would require it to end and thus rendering it less than never ending. Infinites by definition are potential. A good example would be that there is a potential infinite between the numbers 1 and 2: 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.111, etc. Remember that time moves in successive moments. A picture of you starring at the sun would have been an example of one of those moments. Could there be an actual infinite number of moments before this one? Kalam suggests not. One could never arrive at this moment, for an infinite number of moments would have to pass first. In order for an infinite number of moments to pass prior to this one, infinite moments would have to be actualized thus rendering them finite. Evidence for the truth of this abstract argument can be found in the Second Law of Thermodynamics. According to this law, everything in the universe is moving towards equilibrium or entropy. This is why if one pours cold water into a tub then hot water, they don't collect in respective partitions. Rather, they equalize and form a synthesis. Anther example would be that smoke in a bottle does not collect in one side or another, it distributes evenly. This law is a governing force of the universe writ large and so the entire cosmos is experiencing heat death. The entire universe is moving into a state of equilibrium. If the universe consisted of an infinite number of past events, then why has this not happened yet? One can not say there has not been enough time, there has been an infinite amount of time! This demonstrates the finite beginning of the universe, which implies that it was created, which implies a creator. This element of Kalam not withstanding, there is yet another aspect. Each successive moment of time must be infinite in and of itself if an actual infinite could exist. How then could a moment pass? If the universe is finite then it had a beginning; if it had a beginning then one would have to cause its beginning. So the Atheist asks, "What caused the one who caused the beginning?" This question implies an actual infinite regress which would mean we could never have arrived at this moment. But we have arrived at this moment. Therefor, something has to be necessary in and of itself and it either the universe (according to Bertrand Russell) or its a God. But how could the universe actualize its self? We all see that the universe moves in a uniformity of cause and effect and that nothing can cause its self. It seems far more rational to imply that a creator God would then be a necessary being. This God would create an order of cause and effect while not subjecting himself to it for he is the necessary cause and the universe is utterly contingent. This really puts a damper on straw man arguments from Freud and Marx who claim that religion is a result of some form of personal or psychological deficiency (not to mention the genetic fallacy). It is rational to believe there is a God when the universe keeps shoving it in your face!
How does this relate to the atemporal position? If God exists in time then this would imply an actual infinite, which Kalam demonstrates does not exist. This moment could never have arrived if there is an infinite number of preceding moments. However, this moment has arrived. Therefore, there has not been an infinite number of preceding events. This implies that there was a time in which God began to exist. This is impossible given that he is a necessary being (if this seems unsubstantiated please read previous post, if that does not convince you please read 1984), therefore he must exist timelessly.
Feinberg discusses two objections presented by those who advocate God as time laden. Temporalists argue that, "'there cannot ever be a realization of an additive, infinite succession which has a beginning (emphasis original). But God's existence from all eternity past is not the sort of series or succession which has a beginning'". The Temporalist's God has no beginning so they feel this derivative of Kalam has no force. This defense, as it turns out, is docile. Simply because a time laden God requires no beginning it does not answer the question of how we have arrived at this moment. Temporalists are still postulating an actual infinite regardless of the denial of an additive beginning.
One argument is never enough though. The Temporalists offer a second argument which postulates that God's existence before creation was undifferentiated. What does this mean? There is a difference between stating that infinite time existed before creation and saying that an infinite series of events existed before creation. I find this to be unhelpful. Essentially, the Temporalist is saying that God existed in an uneventful, nonpartitional (or no individual moments that move in successive order), homogenized "God-time". Feinberg elicits the help of a scholar named Paul Helm who is very skeptical toward the the Temporalist's position. Helm rejects the notion that there would be a undifferentiated "God-time" prior to the existence of the world. Temporalists feel that a timeless God would be lifeless, but Helm argues that a God without events would be lifeless as well. Helm explains that the implications of "God-time" is that there would be a successive mental life or a succession of thoughts in the divine mind. Time would then be far from undifferentiated but instead be marked by a series of mental events. If God does not exist in a timeless eternity then his thought life would imply a series of events. Any series of events would be infinite and thus imply an actual infinite which Kalam demonstrates can not be.
Feinberg makes an interesting observation. If God had no beginning, has no ending, endures infinitely, though atemporal, the same problem appears to confront the Atemporalist, namely, God's atemporal infinite existence is itself an actual infinite. If God is atemporal the infinite is not a derivative of a tally of infinite moments of God's life, but it is still atemporal duration, and due to the fact that God actually exists, this seems to imply that the problem of an actual infinite is not resolved by the Atemporalist.
A summery of the big picture is offered. We can easily demonstrate that the universe has no hope of autonomy from God as exhibited by Kalam. But our own understanding of God's relationship with time is in jeopardy (jeopardy is probably too strong of a word considering that one should not expect exhaustive knowledge of God in the first place). The idea of God being temporal or of existing in some sort of "God-time" is in trouble due to Kalam. However, the Atemporal position has not provided a sufficient defense once confronted with Kalam as well. Until the Atemporalist offers a non-question-begging response to Kalam themselves both positions have a problem.
personal reflection
I am concerned with Feinberg's use of the word "atemporal duration" in regards to Atemporalists and Kalam. I identified this problem in one of my earlier posts that the word duration is a time laden word and an anthropomorphism. It would be advisable and helpful to reread post number one to acclimate yourself with some of my concerns. I don't believe that we can ever understand how God exists outside of time. Feinberg in so much as admitted this when he said that he felt that it was hard to make sense of the Atemporalist position. I think it makes sense in that it is cogent, but I do not think that it can be fully comprehended. This may be question begging and I should admit that up front, but I don't believe it is circular in regards to Feinberg's critique concerning Atemporalists and Kalam. Atemporalists escape the critique of Kalam due to the fact that time does not apply to God. I believe Feinberg is making a presuppositional error in that the word "duration" is univocal or means the same thing as time laden duration. Atemporalist believe that God is absolutely outside of time and that even terms like duration fail to adequately represent God's relationship with time. Is this position circular? Yes, just as circular as all properly basic assertions. Is it circular in regard to Kalam? No, notions of time do not apply to God.
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
God, Time, and Eternity IV
There are other arguments for timeless eternity that Feinberg covers, we will not be investigating all of them as some are only slightly nuanced from others.
Nature of Time Necessitates a Timeless God
When we think of time we often have the image of a clock with three hands in our minds. We also think of it as a mere measurement that is merely a human construct. This is much more complex than what appears on the surface. The whole issue of time as a mere measurement created by humans is debated. Since modern relativity theory the whole notion of time as being something that humans have made up has been turned upside down on its head. I am not certain how many people, and for how long, have known that time is no mere measurement and is something real to be measured, but I believe that relativity has made more people think about time. At least in my case this is true. Ever since I heard about the theory of relativity my mind has been racing with curiosity and wonder. Have you ever thought about it? If the earth were a little bigger or spun on its axis a little slower would not time change? If your reaction is yes, then I think you are wrong. I would say that our measurement of time would be different. Why is this? Our measurement of time is not the same as time its self. The theory of relativity takes this very seriously and postulates that time is so real (can something be so real? Or very real? Oh well, lol) that time is relative to speed. I would be lying if I told you I completely understood this, but I can give you an illustration that both Einstein and Hawking use:
Let us suppose you were on a train with a friend, and as the train was traveling down the tracks you and your friend start throwing a ball from one end of the train car you occupy to the other. Let us say that the train is traveling at 50 miles per hour and you were throwing the ball at 10 miles per hour. To you and your friend the ball would appear to be traveling at 10 mph. Now let us say there is someone who is way better looking than Jason Sturkie standing outside of the train, standing still and watching the train go by. To this quite handsome fellow (me) the ball would appear to be traveling at 60 mph. Because time is relative to speed, mass, and distance and time is real, not just a measurement, then time is also relative. Therefore, even though it is not obvious to the three parties involved, time is relative because time is real and is relational to objects in the universe; as it is in this illustration.
Let us be clear that this is a contested notion of time. So, time as we know is related to the earth's relationship to the sun. It is difficult to think of a given moment as simultaneous across the universe given relativity theory. If this is the true nature of time then God can not be in time. God is not physical which is necessary for time given our defined understanding above. God is not contingent on anything, he transcends all spacial locations for he is omnipresent (all present). He does not have to hurry to one place to hear one prayer and be off in a dash to hear another. He does not go really fast in space like warp speed in Star Trek. He is present without limitation and without mass (since mass entails limits this is an obvious point). Those who hold that God is within time, or Temporalists as they are sometimes identified, feel that God is not limited by these physical realities. They feel he is in touch with each time frame without being rooted in these time frames. Temporalists say that to say that God is in time is not synonymous to stating that he is in these time frames, but rather that his life encompasses successive states. If God's life operates with in successive states then he a being within time, but not the same way physical objects are. This, in my opinion, affirms a dichotomy: there are two times; one which God experiences and one which is operating within the space-time continuum.
God does not need a personal succession to know all about time frames within the universe. He can know all at once events that occur in temporal sequences with out waiting for those sequences to pass for he decreed these events to happen. It seems to me that the Atemporalist is saying that the notion that because there are sequences that we experience then God must also experience sequences as well, just not our sequences; this is a very generalized conclusion based on the human experience of time. In other words the Atemporalist is accusing the Temporalist of inductive reasoning. Why should this be suspect? Deduction moves from the general to the specific, inductive moves from the specific to the general. Any inductive argument (like almost every Atheist argument) looks at specifics then makes general conclusions and tries to approve them as specific. An example would be that humans have 99 percent DNA in common with primates, therefore humans must have evolved from primates. The theist could respond with his own induction: humans share 99 percent DNA with primates, therefore God uses similar methods in making primates as he does humans. Which one is right? Who knows, the two methods are so inductive and general they are only being paraded as specificity! No wonder they both come to such radically different conclusions, we need a deduction to come to a specific conclusion (there are theistic arguments that can apply deductive reasoning, read miracles by C.S. Lewis or any Ravi Zacharias book). The Temporalist could be right, but their argument comes short of proving it. Another critique by the Atemporalist is that if God was temporal before creation, then what was the reference point for time? It could not be in the physical sense in which we witness in the universe, so just exactly what is the time God was experiencing? Possibly the trinity? That is a different topic of posts that we don't have time to go into. See you next time for part V.
Nature of Time Necessitates a Timeless God
When we think of time we often have the image of a clock with three hands in our minds. We also think of it as a mere measurement that is merely a human construct. This is much more complex than what appears on the surface. The whole issue of time as a mere measurement created by humans is debated. Since modern relativity theory the whole notion of time as being something that humans have made up has been turned upside down on its head. I am not certain how many people, and for how long, have known that time is no mere measurement and is something real to be measured, but I believe that relativity has made more people think about time. At least in my case this is true. Ever since I heard about the theory of relativity my mind has been racing with curiosity and wonder. Have you ever thought about it? If the earth were a little bigger or spun on its axis a little slower would not time change? If your reaction is yes, then I think you are wrong. I would say that our measurement of time would be different. Why is this? Our measurement of time is not the same as time its self. The theory of relativity takes this very seriously and postulates that time is so real (can something be so real? Or very real? Oh well, lol) that time is relative to speed. I would be lying if I told you I completely understood this, but I can give you an illustration that both Einstein and Hawking use:
Let us suppose you were on a train with a friend, and as the train was traveling down the tracks you and your friend start throwing a ball from one end of the train car you occupy to the other. Let us say that the train is traveling at 50 miles per hour and you were throwing the ball at 10 miles per hour. To you and your friend the ball would appear to be traveling at 10 mph. Now let us say there is someone who is way better looking than Jason Sturkie standing outside of the train, standing still and watching the train go by. To this quite handsome fellow (me) the ball would appear to be traveling at 60 mph. Because time is relative to speed, mass, and distance and time is real, not just a measurement, then time is also relative. Therefore, even though it is not obvious to the three parties involved, time is relative because time is real and is relational to objects in the universe; as it is in this illustration.
Let us be clear that this is a contested notion of time. So, time as we know is related to the earth's relationship to the sun. It is difficult to think of a given moment as simultaneous across the universe given relativity theory. If this is the true nature of time then God can not be in time. God is not physical which is necessary for time given our defined understanding above. God is not contingent on anything, he transcends all spacial locations for he is omnipresent (all present). He does not have to hurry to one place to hear one prayer and be off in a dash to hear another. He does not go really fast in space like warp speed in Star Trek. He is present without limitation and without mass (since mass entails limits this is an obvious point). Those who hold that God is within time, or Temporalists as they are sometimes identified, feel that God is not limited by these physical realities. They feel he is in touch with each time frame without being rooted in these time frames. Temporalists say that to say that God is in time is not synonymous to stating that he is in these time frames, but rather that his life encompasses successive states. If God's life operates with in successive states then he a being within time, but not the same way physical objects are. This, in my opinion, affirms a dichotomy: there are two times; one which God experiences and one which is operating within the space-time continuum.
God does not need a personal succession to know all about time frames within the universe. He can know all at once events that occur in temporal sequences with out waiting for those sequences to pass for he decreed these events to happen. It seems to me that the Atemporalist is saying that the notion that because there are sequences that we experience then God must also experience sequences as well, just not our sequences; this is a very generalized conclusion based on the human experience of time. In other words the Atemporalist is accusing the Temporalist of inductive reasoning. Why should this be suspect? Deduction moves from the general to the specific, inductive moves from the specific to the general. Any inductive argument (like almost every Atheist argument) looks at specifics then makes general conclusions and tries to approve them as specific. An example would be that humans have 99 percent DNA in common with primates, therefore humans must have evolved from primates. The theist could respond with his own induction: humans share 99 percent DNA with primates, therefore God uses similar methods in making primates as he does humans. Which one is right? Who knows, the two methods are so inductive and general they are only being paraded as specificity! No wonder they both come to such radically different conclusions, we need a deduction to come to a specific conclusion (there are theistic arguments that can apply deductive reasoning, read miracles by C.S. Lewis or any Ravi Zacharias book). The Temporalist could be right, but their argument comes short of proving it. Another critique by the Atemporalist is that if God was temporal before creation, then what was the reference point for time? It could not be in the physical sense in which we witness in the universe, so just exactly what is the time God was experiencing? Possibly the trinity? That is a different topic of posts that we don't have time to go into. See you next time for part V.
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