God, Time, and Eternity VII

Timelessness and Divine Freedom
I had a pretty funny conversation with a friend of mine after work one night. We were sitting in the parking lot listening to music in his car and I was getting ready to get out and get into my own vehicle when we started an interesting theological conversation. He unwaveringly stated, "We have free will, it is an absolute fact." and I asked him if he believed that God knows all things. He said yes. I said, "So when I get out of your car and get into mine, God knows when that will happen and how?" He said yes. I then asked if those events had to take place the way God knows they will happen, and he was as certain about that as he was about free will. I then asked, "If these future events must unfold in the way God knows they will, then how do I have the freedom to choose otherwise?" He looked forward out the window for a second or two and said, "Yeah, I guess we may not have free will." That was the quickest second guessing to a conviction I have ever experienced. I have to say that it may be to his credit that he was willing to think about the issue honestly and be open to other possibilities, not that that is always a good thing, but in this case it was.
While we see that this problem arises very easily for humanity, it may escape our immediate thoughts that this problem could apply to God. For if God is within time then he must do what he foreknows. God knows what he is going to do and those events must take place the way he foreknows them to take place.
For the Atemporalist God does not have to foreknow because foreknowledge implies a sequential order of moments. The one who will feel the impact of this argument the most is a Temporalist who holds to libertarian free will. The response from this position may be that God's knowledge does not cause what he does and because he is going to do what he wants to do anyway, it then seems that this argument is fairly ineffective. It seems that each position has a good response to this dilemma.