While no atheist can speak for all atheists I do believe he offers a fair summery of religion from a naturalist's perspective. I would be surprised if any atheist could disagree with him. In this post I will be evaluating his contribution to the Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Religion entitled: "Naturalistic Explanations of Theistic Belief" as well as offering a response. The astute observer, or the philosophically adept, may find this latter statement an odd thing to attempt to do. Why would atheism's explanation of religion require a response? After all, worldviews are attempting to make sense of the world around them, why would we expect less from naturalism? Does not Christianity attempt to explain atheism? Well, if an explanation is anything at all it needs to be adequate. It doesn't need to be absolutely perfect, there can be gray areas and unresolved questions. What one ought to demand is that it is consistent with the assumption of the distributor. The consequences, or at least an attempt to offer a conclusion of aptness, will be forthcoming at the end of my post. For now I am going to summarize his article.
What is Theistic Belief in a World with no God?
Anything that falls under the category of existing must be composed of physical components according to Nielson. There are, at the very least, no good reasons to believe that there is anything spiritual or transcendent (burden of proof implied). Nielson warns that there are two extremes that the atheist should avoid: extreme reductionism and hyper scientism. Nielson deserves credit for his tempered approach and I think a lot of wasted debate time could be avoided if other atheists would follow his lead here. There are many propositions that are not anti-scientific, but rather non-scientific. These propositions are promoted by both the religious and the non-religious. This is not a problem, actually, it is essential to make existential sense of the human condition. All of the realities that are postulated by all people involve the physical and since, given naturalistic assumptions, we all do this we may conclude that it is fitting to see the world as equal to nature. What is natural is the world and there is nothing that is not part of nature. There are no purely mental realities. The mental relies on the physical. Religion, as defined by Nielson, is any supernaturalism whether it addresses a deity or not. Atheism need not be militant nor dogmatic for certitude in regard to supernaturalism's falseness or coherence is not ensured. Rather, states Nielson, the atheist should maintain a postmodern skepticism that presupposes or argues that supernaturalism is false (remember: he claims that the burden of proof is on the religious so all that needs to happen is a maintenance of skepticism). Atheism's critical side has a long tradition of great thinkers and philosophers (I could not agree more with him on this point, some of them are my favorite philosophers). They give grounds for rejecting supernaturalism (and thus maintaining the burden of proof in the religious camp). If the critique of religion has been effective, then what atheism has to say about why religion is or what it is becomes very important. Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud have accounts, but they are only effective if religion is defused.
I find this to be a significant statement. It renders Plantinga's critique sterile. Let me explain. And I apologize if I have covered this in a previous post. In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga divides concern over atheistic arguments as de jure or "concerning the law" and de facto "concerning fact." Marx and Freud have similar arguments in that they claim theism to be the result of some need. It's genesis can be found in the desires and needs of the individual, not in fact. As de jure arguments the Christian need not be too concerned with them for the need of an individual is not synonymous with the genesis of belief for that is to fall into the genetic fallacy. How is this so? Well, given the circular nature of the offerings of Marx and Freud one need not go very far to offer a counter interpretation and be logically consistent with the critique. Perhaps God put the desires there to begin with? Could there not be a need for God that arose from circumstances common to believers and there still be a God? Of course! The theist is not saying this is the case, they are merely demonstrating the flaw of the argument. But, I believe that Nielson's parsing is a very good strategy. It moves Freud's and Marx's appraisals in a unilateral path behind naturalism's arguments against supernaturalism thus shielding them from this criticism. They may be able to stand simply as descriptions of theism and support for them is conducted by other arguments which will all be negative. There are no arguments for atheism do to its equivocative posture presuppositionally. This is why Nielson stresses the need for burden of proof to remain on the supernaturalist. But just in case you do not believe me click on this link and hit the "play video" button and evaluate for yourself how well Daniel Dennett does achieving a positive argument for atheism. Keep in mind, the moderator is in no way pressing him on the issue yet Dennett asserts that it is the burden of proof that matters http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/Arguments-for-Atheism-Daniel-Dennett-/33 this is highly illustrative of the logical reality atheism is faced with when positing its own position. If Dennett could have answered the question he would deserve a Nobel Prize but, it was not to be. Instead he spends almost no time on the question and moves into a negative apologetic. This is because he is a very good philosopher, why should he waste his time on a question he cannot logically sustain? This should give pause to the atheist who believes that evolution is a good argument against theism, in fact all appeals to science or nature is simply to stack ontology on top of more ontology. Christian ontology comes from the bible and general revelation, if the christian were to appeal only to the bible for arguments it would be no different than an atheist that only appeals to nature. Atheists are being reasonable when they demand more from the theist than memorizing bible versus and regurgitating them, but the same is true of the atheist who throws out scientific facts as well. There is simply no truth to the postulate that science is a bifurcation from theism or religion in general.
Nielson continues: the Enlightenment has spawned the peppering of arguments through history that, after much development, have been devastating to supernaturalism. Hume and Kant have had reconstructed forms reborn in Mackie and Martin. This refutation has been so thorough that defenders of religion have had to appeal to ever increasing erroneous, or at least, ineffective apologetics. Appeals to the emotive, faith (stacking the deck), meaninglessness, and amorality are hallmark signs of a worldview in trouble.
(Part II, if I get to it, will summarize the rest of the article, and I will offer a critique. I may be lucky enough to get a response from an opponent of my view)
