Christianity and the Study of Ontolotgy

What is Ontology and why should it concern Christians?
As many of you know my area of study is geared mainly towards philosophy in so much as it concerns Atheism. However, I have discovered that this endeavor requires a great deal of proficiency in general philosophy and all of its constituent branches. The branch I find myself focusing on the most is epistemology and I have enjoyed this focus with little regrets. It has even helped me to understand core doctrines and theology. I have come to enjoy the question "How can I know that there is a God?" Always a fascinating conversation even if my argument is not accepted. In the midst of all of these tedious issues is another branch of philosophy that is replete with assumptions and cavalier attitudes. In many ways it is foundational and there is high stakes for the Christian here. In fact, if more people would study ontology we could communicate matters of faith with a lot less baggage. I can assure you of this, the more one studies ontology, christian or otherwise, the quicker you can get to very important questions and answers.
...and ontology is?
the effort to explain the nature of existence and to describe features that are true of all entities. I should be able to clear these questions up in one post. Okay, maybe not. I think we can at least see why this is a worthy area of study for Christians; but truthfully if everyone studied it we wouldn't have the politicians in office we have now because they would have to be a lot more honest. I believe this study would help anyone. One thing is for sure: the person who studies ontology does not come out the other side the same. It will change your entire thought process. You will not be impressed easily by so called "academics" or "scholars". Why? Because, sadly, many of them have never studied ontology either. These are the same people who believe philosophy to be a synonym for "opinion", that is incorrect. Ask this same person what an opinion is and they will try to give you a philosophically objective answer. These are the type of self defeating thinkers we breed in the academic world. C.S. Lewis in his book "A Pilgrims Regress" speaks of a horse called "Reason" that picked him up and he rode it away from the lies, let us join him.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE?
Have you ever thought about dieing? I am going to assume that it is safe to think you have. What is the scariest element of death? I think it is the idea of nonexistence. I almost do not even care about how I die or whether it will be painful, although these are worthy concerns. Until I became a Christian this idea haunted me. The funny thing is is that I can't even conceive nonexistence. Maybe my fear was really the unknown. What is it for something to exist? Let us do a thought experiment. Imagine something real, say, a bike. Now, let us imagine something not real like a leprechaun. What may be most important to realize, in the study of ontology, is that the bike is real. That is one characteristic the bike has. So the most important difference between the bike and the leprechaun is that the bike exists. Is not this difference as real as any other difference in the world? For example, a red crayon and a blue crayon. David Hume wrote that all things imagined are made up of things that actually do exist. Yet, we still recognize that there are things that are made up and do not exist. The Theist should begin to recognize the importance of this question already. Ask a committed Atheist why he or she does not embrace Agnosticism and you may hear this limerick, "I do not have to know everything about the universe to know there is no Easter Bunny that exists so why do I have to know everything about the universe to know there is no God that exists?" (the answer has to do with necessity and contingency but no room on this post to digress) This is being postulated as warrant for the knowledge that the status of God is that he is made up and does not exist as opposed to other things the Atheist will say does exist(notice how epistemology and ontology are closely related here). Existence is important and brash answers won't due for tough questions. Let us ask deeper questions about the nature of existence.
WHAT IS GENUS?
Similar to the biological use; logic is a branch of philosophy and we find its meaning for our purposes here. A class of individuals or a subgroup having similar attributes. An example may be a group of particulars with univocal essential properties. If you do not study philosophy that may have made no sense so let us say "tables" could be a genus. Everything that is not a table would not share its genus. Is existence a genus all to its self? Do all things exist in the same sense? The answers to these questions are very important. Would you say that a table has a different form of existence to a chair? If simply existence is a genus than it appears not. What about a table compared to the number 6? Is the existence of these two things the same? I am inclined to say no. One exists in a completely different relationship to the other and in a completely different way. Not all are inclined to agree that simple existence is a genus. For example, that table has a multitude of parts. We will use an Aristotelian dichotomy to understand this; these multiple parts should be called "accidental properties". So does the table exist or does the sum of all its parts exist and the table only has the appearance of existence? The accidental properties are there and together they make up what we CALL a table. So the table has existence as long as it has its parts, but once the parts are removed the table ceases to exist and yet the parts continue to have existence. Perhaps there are two different types of existence, or maybe there are different kinds of things that have existence. Is it possible that the two things share in one type of existence and that there is only one type of existence in which all things share? Or are there other options? We will come back to this later.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ONTOLOGICALLY EXISTENTIAL POSTULATES
Many dismiss ancient thinkers because it is assumed that scientific progress will answer all our questions. I have read, with great amusement, Carl Sagan who is very impressed with science and scientists. If I were a Buddhist I would probably be tempted to believe that Richard Dawkins is Sagan reincarnated. However the assumptions that go on unquestioned never cease to amaze me. Gary Gutting, professor at Notre Dame and an expert in philosophy of science, religion and European philosophy states, "Since the ancient Greeks, people reflecting on science have been strongly attracted to the idea that there is a single comprehensive method employed in any genuinely scientific work. We will begin with this idealizing assumption, although we will later encounter ways in which it might be doubted." (pg 423, Blackwell, A Companion to the Philosophy of Science) There is now a gap between the philosopher and the scientist. It has not always been this way, but today it is the state in which we find science. Gutting also points out that the a priori sociological assumptions of scientific inquiry are almost always reflective in the result, making true objectivity questionable. Earlier thinkers were better at investigating scientific methodology because they were also philosophers. My main point is that to dismiss ancient thinkers due to how long ago they were positing their claims amounts to ad hominem (Aaron Sorkin, producer of the West Wing, would do well to take note since this comprised a great portion of his argumentation).
...and what about the history of ontological inquiry?
1)Monism
Parmenides argued for the oneness of all reality. The syllogism for his argument can be summed up:
-Reality can be either one or many.
-If reality is many, then many things must differ from each other.
-However, there are only two ways in which things may differ: by being (something) or non-being (nothing).
-How can something differ by nothing? Either something is something or nothing is nothing, but something cannot be nothing and nothing cannot be something.
-Can something differ by something or being? Being seems to be the only thing that all things have in common, things cannot differ in the very same thing they have in common.
-Things cannot differ at all; everything is one.

Ontological Pluralists do have objections and those will be investigated, but lets continue with our chronological survey. The most famous disciple of Parmenides is Zeno (of Zeno's Paradox). He had further proofs to support Monism.
-If reality is many, then absurdities and impossibilities will follow.
-An example of Zeno's meaning is found in his famous arguments. The most famous is "The Achilles and the Tortoise": The Achilles and the Tortoise are having a race and the Achilles gives the tortoise a head start. After the Tortoise is given a bit of time the Achilles starts and one would expect him to pass the Tortoise and win easily (not so in Zeno land). The Achilles must first pass the half way point in order to pass the Tortoise. Then the Achilles must go to the next half way point, then the next, and the next and so on ad infinitum. The Achilles would never catch the Tortoise because there would always be a mid point to traverse and if reality was many there could never be a singular midway point, but this is an absurdity.
-Given Zeno's proof that there is no such thing as an actual infinite mid point then one can safely conclude that the postulate that "reality is many" is a contradiction and should be considered false.
-Reality must be one.

Is all reality mathematically divisible (further on we will explore the notion of the difference between the "world" and the "universe" so if you have questions after this you may find answers there)? Perhaps some things that one would, and could sustain logically, consider "real" can not be divided at all, say propositions; Can I divide a sphere from a ball? If I divide a body of a human have I also divided the person (again, we will look at in more depth later)? Perhaps there is a point in which things may no longer be split or division reaches its finitude (in math it could not, but that would be a POTENTIAL infinite, we are talking about an ACTUAL infinite)?
In response to Parmenides, some have insisted that non-being is a real difference to being and that Parmenides's point needs further substantiation. Some also think that things can differ in being as well. Both entities can be said to posses being while have a different type of being (hold your questions these objections may become more clear later). The most condemning argument against Parmenides is a logical fallacy in his 5th premise; "things cannot differ in the very same thing they have in common" assumes that all things are the same and begs the question. He may as well said "All things are the same because they are the same and that is what they have in common and therefore cannot differ." This is Circular Reasoning.

The next view is Pluralism or "reality is many". The atomists and the Platonists accepted this position.
Atomists felt that things differed by absolute non-being. Their argument was that reality is made up of innumerable and indivisible atoms which fill the void of space. The atoms differed in size, shape, and space. Each atom ontologically possessed its own position in space and the emptiness or non-being around each atom defined the atom by this non-being. The absolute nothingness around each atom defined each atoms difference by absolute non-being. Being could be recognized by non-being. How could nothing cause differentiation? When was the last time nothing caused anything. If my kid is quiet for too long and I ask what she is doing and she says nothing, I know something is going on. Nothing does not cause something and so differing by nothing is akin to not differing at all. We would be doing our selves a disservice not to recognize that indeed atoms have been split. We should also mention super string theory at this point as well.

God, Time, and Eternity X, Part 3

As God takes action outside of time and corresponding action happens in time, how should we understand the many reactions that are performed in a monolithic, atemporal reality (if reaction is a theologically correct term in this case)? In other words, how could God act once to the many actions that an individual makes? After all, there is no time to make actions so there must be one singular deed, not multiple sequential actions. Feinberg admits that this is no problem for the advocates of Middle Knowledge by its self. However, could one hold to Atemporality and Middle Knowledge without problems?
Atemporality holds that God does all actions timelessly and plans all actions to occur at the time of his choosing. keep in mind that the Atemporalist is not saying that these "reactions" happen simply before the given event, time has no meaning here, there is a timeless "reaction" or simple action outside of time. God must do many things in response to every possible action that is going to take place (I fear that Feinberg is assuming that these "reactions" are taking place before a person's choices which is incorrect, but take this critique with a grain of salt). The first point Feinberg makes concerning this problem is that God would be left with a great many unused actions. I have to say that I am puzzled over Feinberg's criticism. I am on the fence as far as middle knowledge is concerned, but this seems like it misunderstands Middle Knowledge. The point isn't that God knows AND does all possible outcomes, it is that he KNOWS all possible outcomes and what would happen otherwise. But, to react to what does not happen is not omniscience, that would be divine speculation (some call Middle Knowledge "Divine Speculation", but I believe this leads to a false understanding of omniscience, the backer of Middle Knowledge is not in danger of the heresy of Open Theism) and that is not the postulate of Middle Knowledge. God knows whether a person would act favorably or unfavorably, say to the gospel, in every possible scenario. If the person would ultimately reject the gospel then God is in keeping with his own character to place this person in a position that seems far removed from the possibility of salvation. God did not DO every possible thing before this person was placed in a remote region outside of earshot of the gospel. God only did in "response" to what he KNEW the person would do. I believe, therefor, that the advocate of Middle Knowledge is in no danger logically to hold to atemporality and Middle Knowledge, Feinberg's critique finds no purchase here. It does not compromise Middle Knowledge, atemporality or a synthesis there of. Feinberg also notes that this problem's propensity increases when libertarian free will is introduced, but again, I believe that he has couched an incorrect definition of Middle Knowledge at the apex of his argument.
Feinberg moves on to the issue of personhood. The first thing he states is that the atemporalist may respond that the notion of personhood is not easily defined. A point well taken in my opinion. Then Feinberg refers to a theologian named William Mann who further appeals to Danial Dennet, yes the Atheist not the fire juggler, whom gives 6 criterion for personhood.
1) A is rational
2) A is a being which states of consciousness can be attributed
3) Others regard or can regard A as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed
4) A is capable as regarding others as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed
5) A is capable of verbal communication
6) A is self-conscience; i.e., A is capable or regarding him/her/its self as subject to states of consciousness
This is a list that Peter Singer and other abortion/euthanasia advocates would love to champion as the quintessential definition of personhood. This definition would serve any eugenics program well. I, however, have a much more liberal interpretation of personhood which includes bearing the image of God. But wait! Don't you have to assume the bible to be true in order to maintain this position? I never said I would use it as an isolated apologetic, but among Christian theists, I see no problem. Does one need to meet this criteria to achieve personhood? Not in my opinion. Does God need to meet this criteria to be a person. I think he does meet it, however I'm not sure that he needs to. Which brings me back to the point that Feinberg dismisses, are we ready to give rigid terms and conditions to personhood? In many cases I think not. But, I also have to admit that Feinberg's argument may still stand in light of the fact that certainly God meets these criteria even if the unborn does not. So I will grant him the argument to continue.
Feinberg is one of the most responsible scholars I have ever read, in fact he has inspired me to do likewise. He doesn't let me down here either, as he urges caution with this definition of personhood. However, God does meet this definition and except for provision 1 and 5 Feinberg sees no hope for the atemporalist to survive the critique of person in regard to numbers 2,3,4, and 6. An atemporal person should be able to do these things. The list Feinberg gives is as follows: intending, purposing, remembering, forgetting, responding to prayer, becoming angry, rejoicing, and being effected by actions of others. I am once again puzzled. Why does God have to do these things the same way man does? In fact, some of these things are simply anthropomorphisms despite Feinberg's attempts to say otherwise. Cannot God respond to prayer in perfection, rather than in reaction? I can't recall a time in scripture when remembering or forgetting, in reference to God, meant anything less than perfect forgetfulness. What does that mean? That God no longer counts sin against us AS IF he had forgotten something. What happens when someone forgets a date? They don't go on it. What happens when God forgets sin? He does not punish , as if it had never happened or as if there was a sin to remember in the first place. AND YET, God does indeed remember otherwise he would have no need for his covenants. We count on him remembering even when he so called "forgets" because we rely on his justice. I see no reason to give up the traditional understanding of God's relationship to time as atemporal because of what is clearly meant to be understood as analogies for the human cerebral palate. Additionally, it seems that Feinberg simply assumes that because there are things that require action in time for humans that this carries over for God because it is difficult to understand otherwise. Why should this bother us; we can not understand God exhaustively and there has been no readily ascertainable contradictions that are worthy of note.