God, Time, and Eternity X, Part 3

As God takes action outside of time and corresponding action happens in time, how should we understand the many reactions that are performed in a monolithic, atemporal reality (if reaction is a theologically correct term in this case)? In other words, how could God act once to the many actions that an individual makes? After all, there is no time to make actions so there must be one singular deed, not multiple sequential actions. Feinberg admits that this is no problem for the advocates of Middle Knowledge by its self. However, could one hold to Atemporality and Middle Knowledge without problems?
Atemporality holds that God does all actions timelessly and plans all actions to occur at the time of his choosing. keep in mind that the Atemporalist is not saying that these "reactions" happen simply before the given event, time has no meaning here, there is a timeless "reaction" or simple action outside of time. God must do many things in response to every possible action that is going to take place (I fear that Feinberg is assuming that these "reactions" are taking place before a person's choices which is incorrect, but take this critique with a grain of salt). The first point Feinberg makes concerning this problem is that God would be left with a great many unused actions. I have to say that I am puzzled over Feinberg's criticism. I am on the fence as far as middle knowledge is concerned, but this seems like it misunderstands Middle Knowledge. The point isn't that God knows AND does all possible outcomes, it is that he KNOWS all possible outcomes and what would happen otherwise. But, to react to what does not happen is not omniscience, that would be divine speculation (some call Middle Knowledge "Divine Speculation", but I believe this leads to a false understanding of omniscience, the backer of Middle Knowledge is not in danger of the heresy of Open Theism) and that is not the postulate of Middle Knowledge. God knows whether a person would act favorably or unfavorably, say to the gospel, in every possible scenario. If the person would ultimately reject the gospel then God is in keeping with his own character to place this person in a position that seems far removed from the possibility of salvation. God did not DO every possible thing before this person was placed in a remote region outside of earshot of the gospel. God only did in "response" to what he KNEW the person would do. I believe, therefor, that the advocate of Middle Knowledge is in no danger logically to hold to atemporality and Middle Knowledge, Feinberg's critique finds no purchase here. It does not compromise Middle Knowledge, atemporality or a synthesis there of. Feinberg also notes that this problem's propensity increases when libertarian free will is introduced, but again, I believe that he has couched an incorrect definition of Middle Knowledge at the apex of his argument.
Feinberg moves on to the issue of personhood. The first thing he states is that the atemporalist may respond that the notion of personhood is not easily defined. A point well taken in my opinion. Then Feinberg refers to a theologian named William Mann who further appeals to Danial Dennet, yes the Atheist not the fire juggler, whom gives 6 criterion for personhood.
1) A is rational
2) A is a being which states of consciousness can be attributed
3) Others regard or can regard A as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed
4) A is capable as regarding others as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed
5) A is capable of verbal communication
6) A is self-conscience; i.e., A is capable or regarding him/her/its self as subject to states of consciousness
This is a list that Peter Singer and other abortion/euthanasia advocates would love to champion as the quintessential definition of personhood. This definition would serve any eugenics program well. I, however, have a much more liberal interpretation of personhood which includes bearing the image of God. But wait! Don't you have to assume the bible to be true in order to maintain this position? I never said I would use it as an isolated apologetic, but among Christian theists, I see no problem. Does one need to meet this criteria to achieve personhood? Not in my opinion. Does God need to meet this criteria to be a person. I think he does meet it, however I'm not sure that he needs to. Which brings me back to the point that Feinberg dismisses, are we ready to give rigid terms and conditions to personhood? In many cases I think not. But, I also have to admit that Feinberg's argument may still stand in light of the fact that certainly God meets these criteria even if the unborn does not. So I will grant him the argument to continue.
Feinberg is one of the most responsible scholars I have ever read, in fact he has inspired me to do likewise. He doesn't let me down here either, as he urges caution with this definition of personhood. However, God does meet this definition and except for provision 1 and 5 Feinberg sees no hope for the atemporalist to survive the critique of person in regard to numbers 2,3,4, and 6. An atemporal person should be able to do these things. The list Feinberg gives is as follows: intending, purposing, remembering, forgetting, responding to prayer, becoming angry, rejoicing, and being effected by actions of others. I am once again puzzled. Why does God have to do these things the same way man does? In fact, some of these things are simply anthropomorphisms despite Feinberg's attempts to say otherwise. Cannot God respond to prayer in perfection, rather than in reaction? I can't recall a time in scripture when remembering or forgetting, in reference to God, meant anything less than perfect forgetfulness. What does that mean? That God no longer counts sin against us AS IF he had forgotten something. What happens when someone forgets a date? They don't go on it. What happens when God forgets sin? He does not punish , as if it had never happened or as if there was a sin to remember in the first place. AND YET, God does indeed remember otherwise he would have no need for his covenants. We count on him remembering even when he so called "forgets" because we rely on his justice. I see no reason to give up the traditional understanding of God's relationship to time as atemporal because of what is clearly meant to be understood as analogies for the human cerebral palate. Additionally, it seems that Feinberg simply assumes that because there are things that require action in time for humans that this carries over for God because it is difficult to understand otherwise. Why should this bother us; we can not understand God exhaustively and there has been no readily ascertainable contradictions that are worthy of note.